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Important Issues Related To The Economic and Political 
Development of The Russian Federation 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union was welcomed by most of the 
world as the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a New World Order. 
Newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin promised to quickly transform 
the once feared communist nation into a full democracy with a free-market 
economy. 
However, the great promise and optimism of 1991 and 1992 has quickly 
faded as Russia struggles to carry out what is, for all practical purposes, an 
unprecedented Triple Revolution. First, it must make the transition from a 
command economy to a market economy. Second, it must go from authori-
tarian rule to a democratic government. Third, it must make the adjustment 
from imperial power to a nation state. 1 
A multitude of issues could be discussed in relation to the current situa-
tion in Russia, most of which could be analyzed in great detail. However, 
the purpose of this paper is to simply identify some of the more important 
issues related to the three most immediate and pervasive transitions the 
country must address. This paper is not meant to be a dissertation. Instead, 
it offers a broad discourse of information in an effort to provide an extensive 
background for creating a junior high-level teaching unit on Russia and the 
former Soviet republics. Issues will be analyzed in varying levels of detail in 
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order to better understand the problems the region faces in making the tran-
sitions in question and the current issues related to them. 
In one way or another, all current issues in Russia are related to one or 
more of the three transitions. Furthermore, each of the individual revolutions 
in many ways is dependent upon the outcomes of the others. Therefore, in 
order to make any one of these changes successfully, Russia must, in effect, 
complete all three in concert. The challenge it faces is tremendous and, 
perhaps, insurmountable. 
Command Economy to Market Economy 
Russia's attempt to make the transition from a command economy to a 
free-market system has no historical precedent. Several countries in Eastern 
Europe are attempting similar transformations, but none come close to the 
scale of what must be carried out in Russia. For more than 70 years the 
Russian people have known nothing but complete dependency on the state. 
Now, they must construct an entirely new system from the ground up. 
What Needs To Be Done? 
There was little in the remnants of the Soviet command system to aid 
Russia ' s transition to capitalism. Under the Soviet system, central planning 
committees made all decisions pertaining to production and distribution in 
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both industry and agriculture. The influence of political forces in making 
most economic decisions prevented free-market forces from functioning and 
has resulted in many of the problems that plague Russia's efforts to create a 
market economy today. Given the complete breakdown and failure of the 
communist system, Russia has been forced to take several drastic steps 
simultaneously to implant a free-market system within the ruins of the old 
system. 2 
Privatization of Russian shops, businesses, industries, agriculture, and 
other enterprises is the first and most important step toward creating a free-
market economy. Privatization is necessary to create market competition and 
encourage entrepreneurship, both of which will help ensure the production of 
sufficient amounts of consumer goods at realistic prices. The introduction of 
competition is the only way to make industry responsive to the needs of 
Russian consumers, but it will be difficult given the monopolistic legacy of 
the Soviet system. 3 
During the 1930s, the Soviet Union's agricultural resources were collec-
tivized into large state-owned farms and industries were organized into huge 
enterprises, many of which became the single producers of certain products. 
In 1990, an estimated 2,000 enterprises in the former Soviet Union were the 
sole manufacturers of specific products. Locomotive cranes, sewing ma-
chines, tram rails, cooking equipment, and other products were manufac-
tured by one individual company. 4 
The monopolization of key industries led to severe inefficiencies in pro-
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duction. Planners paid no attention to market signals indicating the wants 
and needs of consumers. Chronic shortages of consumer goods were com-
mon. At the same time, the emphasis on quantity rather than quality re-
sulted in the production of inferior goods. 5 
Most state industries eventually became a drain on the economy, but 
government subsidies kept even the most non-productive enterprises operat-
ing. Industrial managers were provided raw materials by the state at no 
cost, so they had little concern for waste or infefficiency. 6 
Russian workers were left out of the planning process and had no forum 
to offer suggestions for improving production. Having no real stake in their 
own productivity, laborers lacked any incentive to work hard. Many factories 
essentially were agencies of social welfare, maintaining unnecessarily large 
work forces and promoting mass underemployment. A favorite and painfully 
accurate saying of many Soviet workers was "We pretend to work, and they 
pretend to pay us. " 7 The recreation of a Russian work ethic is a major chal-
lenge for any economic reform. 
Even if privatization can be accomplished, Russia must still overcome its 
chronic inexperience with free-market operations. Many Russian business 
owners today are highly trained but lack a technical understanding of how to 
effectively operate and manage a private enterprise. 8 Successful 
privatization is the key needed to give Russian people a stake in their own 
futures and to develop their individual initiatives to succeed. 
Another challenge facing Russia in its attempt to build a free-market 
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system is the creation of capital, which is vital for economic development 
and growth. Under the Soviet system, government planning committees 
allocated money, raw materials, and other forms of capital to different re-
gions of the USSR. Investment allocations reflected the state's agenda in 
terms of economic and political priorities instead of market forces. 9 Even 
unsuccessful industries were heavily subsidized by the state, thus relieving 
managers of any responsibility for raising their own capital. 
Without the state to provide capital investment, fledgling Russian firms 
must look to new ways to raise their own. Russian enterprises must attract 
foreign investors, as well as persuade their own people to invest in the 
nation's economic recovery. Given the economic hardships suffered by most 
Russian people in recent years, trying to convince the masses to risk what 
little money they have by investing it in the country's fragile new businesses 
may be futile. 
Moreover, Russia continues to lack many of the basic economic and 
political institutions needed for a free-market system to function. Economic 
institutions - such as a free banking system, stock exchanges, and a sys-
tem of social security - were not part of the country's command system, 
nor were they needed, according to communist leaders. 
Currently, no viable legal infrastructure exists in Russia to support the 
operation of a capitalist system. There is no tax system or any method for 
checking tax payments, except for state enterprises and institutions. 10 No 
laws for establishing contracts, declaring bankruptcies, or settling disputes 
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between private companies exist in Russia. 11 Procedures and laws pertaining 
to the establishment of property rights remain vague even in the midst of 
increasing privatization. 12 
The creation of a more favorable climate for business remains a top prior-
ity for the Russian government. "Only when businesses can calculate risk, 
profit, prices, and so on and be assured of their property rights, will they 
invest in a volume and manner likely to have significant impact. 13 
Furthermore, hazy boundaries between legal and illegal business have 
allowed organized crime to infiltrate many aspects of the economy. By 
1993, the Russian "Mafiya" was believed to control over 40 percent of all 
turnover in goods and services in the country .14 
The lack of a stable and exchangeable currency also has contributed to 
slowed economic growth in Russia. Soviet monetary policy destroyed the 
value of the ruble by allowing the routine printing additional money to subsi-
dize failing state industries. Since 1991, the Central Bank has continued this 
practice in order to preserve the remaining large state industries and to pre-
vent massive unemployment. The result has been hyperinflation. For many 
citizens, the ruble has become useless for conversion into goods, replaced by 
barter as the main method of trading. 15 
A market economy requires a widely accepted medium of exchange that 
can purchase goods and services on the domestic market and that is easily 
converted into foreign currency at free-market rates. The latter is especially 
vital for the incorporation of Russia into the international economy. Govern-
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ment mismanagement of the money supply has made the ruble virtual! 
worthless. To reverse this trend, Russia must take steps to reduce inflation 
and work to establish an unregulated banking system of competitive note 
issue.16 
How To Do It 
Much debate surrounds how various free-market reforms should be car-
ried out in Russia. Two basic approaches have been suggested. The first is 
been called "shock therapy" and has been used in Russia since 1992. A 
second and more conservative approach has been offered recently in light of 
the problems associated with shock therapy. The advantages and disadvan-
tages both approaches have fueled controversy since Russia began its trans-
formation to capitalism. 
Shock therapy refers to the creation of a capitalist system through rapid 
privatization, price liberalization, and anti-inflationary "tight" money. 17 In 
1992, shock therapy was introduced in Russia by Boris Yeltsin's former 
Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, with the blessings of several leading Western 
economists, including Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard. 18 Despite the enormous 
political and social aftershocks which have accompanied radical economic 
reforms in Russia, shock therapy has been advocated by many Russian and 
foreign economists for a number of reasons. 
First, the transition to capitalism involves many distinct and complex 
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reforms. Price liberalization, privatization, monetary reform, and the creation 
of working institutions cannot be introduced gradually through a piece- meal 
approach because all are interconnected. Therefore, radical and complete 
transformation remains the only viable approach. 19 
Second, the drastic approach characterized by shock therapy is consid-
ered necessary by some, who believe the old economic structures must be 
entirely abandoned in order to achieve a complete break with the old and, 
largely discredited, regime. Supporters of such extreme measures argue that 
gradual reform only allows the old bureaucracy to maintain its influence, 
slowing or obstructing further changes. 20 
Third, advocates of shock therapy contend that the corruption of the 
industrial bureaucracy and the inefficiency of state enterprises can only be 
changed by subjecting them to the harsh realities of the free market. Market 
competition is needed to force industries to make efficient use of their labor 
and capital resources, and to be more attentive to the needs of the consum-
ers. 21 
Supporters of radical reform point to the successes of shock therapy in 
transforming Poland's economy. In 1990, that nation's first post-communist 
government introduced a radical economic reform program. As in Russia, the 
application of shock therapy initially caused continued economic hardships 
for most Polish people. After three years, however, reliable economic indica-
tors show Poland's reforms may be working. 22 
Within months, radical reforms brought an end to lines and shortages in 
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most parts of Poland. In addition, a stabilization program ended 
hyperinflation, bringing the inflation rate down to about 3 percent per month 
by mid-1990. 23 Despite a 30 percent reduction in productivity and declining 
standards of living, each of Poland's succeeding governments managed to 
maintain the basic reform program. Industrial production has risen, and 
private enterprises have created 2 million new jobs in industry and com-
merce. 24 
Industrial production increased more than 13 percent during 1992. The 
rise in production was accompanied by a boom of export trade that has 
allowed Poland to afford many different products - including automobiles, a 
variety of electronic equipment, and other consumer goods. 25 Individual 
consumption also has risen, as evidenced by the increasing proportion of 
Polish households with modern appliances, such as refrigerators, televisions, 
and video cassette recorders. 26 
Perhaps the most impressive statistics include those demonstrating 
Poland's success in selling its goods on the world market, mostly in Western 
Europe. Its convertible currency exports rose from less than $8 billion in 
1989 to about $14 billion in 1992. Western aid has played an integral role 
in Poland's success. Western nations committed $1 billion in initial assis-
tance, which helped to stabilize Polish currency (the zloty). In 1991, the 
West agreed to help Poland lower its huge external debt, on the condition 
that it be done in two gradual phases. Preconditions of this kind worked to 
ensure Poland would continue its reform program. 27 
13 
According to shock therapy's supporters, the lesson to be learned from 
the Polish model is that the first stage of transformation may be rough and 
full of hardship, but eventually stabilization and growth will result. 28 If given 
time and timely Western support, they maintain shock therapy will have 
similar results in Russia. 
Critics of shock therapy are quick to point out that the situation in Russia 
differs significantly from that in Poland. They argue Russia is faced by a 
greater number of and more critical barriers to radical transformation than its 
Polish counterpart. Poland's relatively small size and more homogeneous 
ethnic population aided reforms and less of the country's farmland had been 
collectivized. 29 
Russia, on the other hand, must contend with a number of regional and 
ethnic struggles, as well as the continued presence of a huge military indus-
trial complex, the lingering influence of the disbanded Communist Party, and 
a multi-ethnic population spread out over a huge geographic area. Further-
more, Russia's political arena is much more complex than that of Poland, and 
the Russian people have 20 more years of the communist experience. 30 
Other detractors of shock therapy maintain the approach has been used 
primarily to create quick economic progress in developing nations, such as 
Chile and Bolivia, in order to help them pay their debts to Western countries. 
A similar plan would have less application to Russia, given its unique eco-· 
nomic and political circumstances. Critics further point out that shock 
therapy reforms were forced on the Russian people, without allowing oppor-
14 
tunity for debate or consideration. 31 
While most opponents of radical economic reform do not advocate a 
return to a command system, they do agree that reforms in Russia must be 
more gradual and include a greater degree of state control in order to be 
successful. New Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydrin is searching for new 
policies to reverse the effects of shock therapy. Some of Russia's leading 
economists, many of whom are long-time opponents of shock therapy, re-
portedly are developing a new plan for economic revival. 32 
The basic thrust of the new plan is to actively use government to aid 
industrial recovery and innovation, while stimulating business activity and 
new investment through a mixture of tax incentives and direct public invest-
ment. 33 Details of the new approach to reform are not clear, but 
Chernomydrin's supporters expect a more pragmatic, if not slower, continua-
tion of Russia's reforms. 34 
The main criticism of the more gradual approach is that it will try to 
rebuild the Russian economy by concentrating on the recovery of key indus-
tries, which will then serve as the engines of growth for the rest of the 
economy. The idea is not a new one. It was a basic component of 
Perestroika, which failed miserably. 35 
Opponents of gradual reform insist that basing Russia's economic recov-
ery on the restructuring of existing enterprises will wipe out the country's 
growing private sector and deprive consumers of new manufacturers, new 
services, and imports. Additionally, they maintain the government would 
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need to provide further subsidies to keep these industries afloat, thus in-
creasing inflation.36 
Progress of Economic Reforms To Date 
Although adequate current statistical information concerning the state of 
the Russian economy is not yet available, some recent figures shed light on 
the developments which have occurred since the institution of radical re-
forms in 1992. 
True to form, shock therapy has been accompanied by great economic 
hardships for most Russian people. Since 1992, price liberalization has 
caused prices of consumer goods to skyrocket. Although more basic goods 
are becoming available, soaring prices have made many of them, such as 
clothes and shoes, nearly inaccessible for most consumers.37 
In 1992, prices rose on an average of 15 to 30 percent per month.38 
The greatest increases occurred in the food industry.39 Some Russians 
spend up to 90 percent of their incomes simply for food! 40 
Citizens' deposits in savings banks have lost their value, in essence, 
being confiscated by the state and no longer serving even as a buffer to 
financial strain. According to the Ministry of Social Security, an estimated 20 
percent of the population - some 30 million people - are living below the 
poverty level. 41 An effective social safety net for them, in the form of social 
security or related institutions, has yet to be implemented to help cushion the 
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blow of radical reform. On the average, living standards fell for all Russians 
by 50 percent at the end of 1992.42 
An increase in fuel prices in May 1993 accelerated the rise in retail 
prices, worsened the financial situation of enterprise, and has contributed to 
rising unemployment. 43 During the same year, the volume in physical terms 
of production continued to fall for both foodstuffs and non-food products. 
Production fell by at least 40 percent. 44 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
of Russia fell by more than 30 percent during 1992 and 1993,45 while the 
national debt for the latter year was estimated at about 30 percent of the 
GDP.46 
Further indicating the instability of the Russian economy, capital invest-
ment fell by 45 percent in 1992 and continued to decline in 1993.47 
Russia's volatile economic climate has spawned "capital flight," as illegal 
sales of raw materials deprive the country of valuable resources. The profits 
from many legal and illegal enterprises are increasingly ending up in Western 
banks, where the money is safe and collects interest. This drain of capital 
has left Russian industries with little money to overhaul existing industrial 
equipment or to buy new machinery. In 1992 alone, an estimated $4 to $15 
billion of potential capital investment were channeled elsewhere. 48 
Very little current information is available concerning the extent of foreign 
investment in Russia. In 1987, the Soviet government legalized the forma-
tion of joint ventures between Soviet and foreign firms, and they became the 
most popular form of foreign investment in Russia. 49 
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At the start of 1991, an estimated 2,900 joint ventures were registered 
in the former Soviet Union, but only 1,604 of them were actually operating 
by August of that year. Of the joint ventures involving member countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 83 percent were operating 
in Russia, accounting for 72.2 percent of CIS foreign trade. 50 By the end of 
1991, however, the total stock of foreign investment in the entire former 
Soviet Union was equivalent to less than 0.1 percent of the Soviet gross 
national product. 51 
Privatization has been the most successful aspect of the shock therapy 
program in Russia. A state privatization program was created and imple-
mented in 1992. 52 The first small enterprises, such as shops and garages, 
were auctioned in the summer of 1992. By the end of 1993, almost all 
shops, restaurants, workshops, and other small operations had been 
privatized in many areas of the country. Privatization has taken place in 82 
of Russia's 88 regions and republics. 53 
The privatization of Russia's larger industries began in January 1993 and 
has progressed much more slowly. In October 1992, the government began 
to issue 10,000-ruble vouchers to every citizen for the purchase of shares in 
firms and other state-owned property. 54 In 1993, 8,010 middle-sized and 
large enterprises were privatized, employing 8.3 million workers. This figure 
indicates that just over two-fifths of Russia's manufacturing work force is 
employed by a private company. 55 In all, an estimated 100,000 or more 
state companies have been privatized, accounting for more than 50 percent 
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of the GDP. 56 
Privatization of agriculture has been less successful. In October 1992, the 
government ordered collective farms to sell plots to anyone who wanted to 
farm privately. 57 By 1 993, statistics revealed that privatization of agriculture 
had taken a number of different forms. About 4,500 collectives decided to 
maintain their own enterprise status, while more than 300 open-type joint 
stock companies were formed. Also, 3,800 limited liability and mixed part-
nerships were created, along with 608 agricultural cooperatives. 58 
The establishment of private peasant farms has been limited by shortages 
of equipment, material-technical resources, and financial assets. Additionally, 
limited opportunities to acquire feed and young animals have kept livestock 
farming from becoming broadly developed. 59 
Despite gloomy reports from the first two years of reform, more recent 
indications reveal the Russian economy is beginning to improve. Some au-
thorities now are claiming that previous data failed to accurately assess the 
size of the new emerging market economy and underestimations were made. 
Recent indicators show inflation has fallen from 800 percent a year ago to 
around 100 percent. 60 Meanwhile, foreign companies invested about $1 
billion in 1993 by buying shares in privatized firms. Optimistic Russian offi-
cials believe this figure will increase significantly in the near future. 61 
Prime Minister Chernomydrin has recently announced his plans to seek 
legislation granting foreign investors a five-year exemption from paying taxes 
on profits, removing tariffs on imports of materials for joint ventures, and 
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permitting foreigners to buy the land on which they operate their businesses. 
The implementation of any one of these measures would be a significant 
concession on the part of the government to spur investment. 62 
Wrongly or rightly so, many Russians have associated the hardships of 
economic reforms with Yeltsin's shock therapy approach. Given the legacy 
of the communist economic system, it is likely any plan of reform would 
have been accompanied by similar adversity. While it is clear that Yeltsin is 
distancing himself from more radical reforms, his new direction, its antici-
pated results, and how effective it will be have yet to be realized. 
Imperial Power to Nation-State 
The second major transformation that Russia must undergo is switching 
from a multi-ethnic empire to a nation-state. Russia's future will be largely 
dependent on its ability to establish new economic and political relationships 
with the former republics, while maintaining regional stability in the face of 
escalating ethnic conflict and intense nationalism. 
The Communist Legacy 
The Soviet Union's centrally planned economy was developed in such a 
way that the republics and semi-autonomous regions within the Russian 
Federation found it impossible to function on their own outside of its frame-
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work. Industries were concentrated in one location and made dependent 
upon raw materials from a number of different republics. 63 
In terms of trade, the Soviet republics were virtually isolated from the 
outside world, trading almost exclusively among themselves. One exception 
was the Soviet government's export of energy resources, which it used to 
gain hard currency for the purchase technology from the west. 64 
Interdependence was the rule of the system. Most republics depended 
heavily on Russia for their energy resources. In 1990, Russia produced 90 
percent of the Soviet Union's oil, almost 80 percent of its natural gas, and 
56 percent of its coal. Russia also produced 91 percent of the union's tim-
ber, 85 percent of its paper, and 72 percent of its cotton cloth. 65 
Likewise, the Russian Republic depended heavily on inter-republican trade 
to support its own economy. Today, it has been estimated that, if Russia 
cut all ties with the former republics and the rest of the world, it would only 
be able to produce 65 percent of its current gross output. 66 
Perhaps the most potentially destructive legacy of communist rule is the 
nation's ethnic structure. The Soviet Union was made up of well over 1 00 
different ethnic groups, divided among 1 5 republics and autonomous regions 
within the Russian Federation itself. The larger republics were loosely based 
on the main ethnic group in each, although each republic contained varying 
populations of several different groups. 
By turning ethnic identity of all groups into official nationalities with a 
clearly defined territorial dimension, Soviet leaders set the stage for future 
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ethnic conflicts and nationalist expression. The communists also staged 
migrations of whole groups across the Soviet Union to create minorities, who 
would depend on Moscow for protection and support further justifying Soviet 
control over the empire. 67 
The re-emergence of nationalism in the former republics, long supressed 
by the communists, was one of the main ingredients in the collapse of the 
Soviet empire. Beginning in 1989, the Soviet Army became unable to con-
tain ethnic tensions. Since then, disputes over borders and conflicting terri-
torial claims have erupted into civil wars in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Geor-
gia. Separatist movements by smaller ethnic groups within Russia and sev-
eral of the newly independent states further threaten the region's stability. 68 
Issues and Interests In The Near Abroad 
Russia continues to have vital economic and political interests in the 
former republics. The collapse of the Soviet Union inspired the former repub-
lics to try to distance themselves, both politically and economically, from 
Russia, most visibly by initially attempting to carve out their own indepen-
dent development strategies. Most leaders of the republics had long been 
convinced that Moscow intentionally limited regional progress for its own 
benefit. Only the weakest states, like Kyrgyzstan, continued to look to Mos-
cow for help after the union's dissolutuion. 69 
The breakup of the Soviet Union, however, had disastrous consequences 
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for the economies of all the former republics. The collapse of already weak-
ened industry was accelerated as factories were cut off from both suppliers 
and regular customers, disrupting the flow of goods and causing the depar-
ture of trained personnel. Several republics erected trade barriers further 
limiting the flow of goods and services. Trade between the former fellow 
republics dropped off drastically70 and the severing of economic ties resulted 
in a decline of nearly 50 percent in Russia's net exports. 71 
Continued economic hardships in the successor states since indepen-
dence have caused some to change their minds about maintaining their defi-
ance of Moscow. Recently, election results in both Belarus and Ukraine 
reflected the desire of those two nations to move toward closer relations 
desire of those two nations to move toward closer relations with Russia. 72 
Meanwhile, Russia continues to aggressively pursue its own economic 
interests in the region. These interests include access to ports, transporta-
tion, communications, and manufacturing plants where production has not 
yet been matched by Russian factories. 73 Russia has considerable interests 
in maintaining access to key natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas 
reserves in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Russian government also 
has exerted pressure to get shares in joint ventures for oil production in 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 74 
Russia's political interests in the near abroad center around its need to 
deal with increasing regional instability caused, primarily, by ethnic violence. 
Russia must try to find solutions to the continuing ethnic disputes and other 
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conflicts in its near abroad, lest this turmoil negatively affect its own efforts 
to develop new economic and political institutions. 
Thus far, Russian efforts to mediate ethnic conflicts have been biased 
and subject to lobbying from ethnic-centered communities within the Russian 
Federation. 75 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been 
largely ineffective at such mediation for the simple reason that none of the 
involved countries has been willing to cede the sovereignty that accepting 
Russian arbitration implies, since Russia is the dominant member of the CIS. 
In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, for example, Azerbaijan 
which is not a full CIS member - was reluctant to accept CIS mediation 
because the Russians have traditionally been pro-Armenian. 76 
Few plausible solutions exist to the problems in Russia's near abroad. 
Suggestions have included revising the borders of the former republics or 
even conducting mass migrations of different ethnic groups while keeping 
the borders intact. Neither one of these solutions is viable, however, given 
the diversity and distribution of members of different groups. The most 
promising solution on the table thus far would require guarantees by the 
republics to respect the rights of ethnic minorities within their borders, in-
cluding the right to cultural and territorial autonomy. 77 
In the absence of any real solution to ethnic instability, the responsibility 
of keeping order in the former republics has fallen squarely on the shoulders 
of Russia, since it is the only nation strong enough to carry the burden. In 
some places, like the Central Asian republics, Russian soldiers are officially 
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accepted as part of a standing mutual defense pact of the CIS. 78 Russia still 
has an estimated 1 50,000 troops distributed in 10 of the former republics. 79 
In Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, Russian leaders have justified the 
presence of these troops as "peacekeepers," but widespread accusations 
charge that Russian units have been actively supporting one side or the other 
in ethnic conflicts there. 80 
Some authorities have even pointed to the increasing Russian military 
presence in the republics as a sign of Russia's nee-imperialist intentions; 
however, it has substantial cause for actively working to maintain peace and 
stability in the near abroad. Violence in bordering nations could easily spill 
over into Russian territory, making it necessary for Russia to intervene later 
on a massive scale. 81 More importantly, the government could not afford a 
mass influx of refugees that would accompany any significant turmoil. 
Those displaced would only place additional stress on the already floundering 
economy and possibly increase the numbers of those opposing further free-
market and democratic reforms. 82 In 1993, over 2 million refugees poured 
across Russia's borders. 83 Among them were many ethnic Russians. 
The 25 million ethnic Russians living in the former republics continue to 
be a great concern for the government. Most of these people moved to or 
were moved by the Soviet government to different parts of the empire in 
order to provide skilled labor for industry or to help "Russify" the local cul-
tures. 84 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, these ethnic Russians suddenly 
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found themselves living in foreign countries, where they faced resentment, 
discrimination, and physical danger due to increasing violence and turmoil. 85 
Thousands of them have already migrated back to Russia. 86 
The plight of ethnic Russians in the near abroad has also served to gener-
ate political troubles at home, as public anger concerning the treatment of 
Russians abroad has provided welcomed ammunition for the nation's extreme 
nationalist politicians. The need to protect "fellow Russians" has been used 
by nationalists to justify their call for the re-establishment of Russian domi-
nance over the former republics, a change from which an increasing number 
of Russians have come to blame for Russia's own problems. 87 
Such sentiment has forced Yeltsin's government to focus more attention 
on these issues, as evidenced by his current hardline stance in regard to the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia. 88 As large numbers of Russians 
continue to migrate back to Russia, it's possible that Russia's stake in the 
neighboring republics will diminish; but the greatest threat to stability may 
come from those ethnic Russians who choose to stay where they are. 89 
The majority of ethnic Russians living outside of the Russian Federation 
are concentrated in contiguous regions in eastern Ukraine and northern 
Kazakhstan. Russians make up nearly 25 percent of the Ukraine's popula-
tion. In Kazakhstan, they constitute almost half of the total population. Sig-
nificant populations of ethic Russians also exist in Crimea and the Baltic 
States. 90 
The Russian government has actively discouraged any separatist inten-
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tions by these groups, demanding instead only that their basic rights be 
respected. 91 Nevertheless, the danger exists that separatist groups could 
begin to demand their own right to self-determination, independent of any 
sponsorship from Moscow. Some authorities have referred to such a 
scenerio as the "Texas Solution," in which a popular rebellion by ethnic 
Russians would lead to the region's annexation by Russia. 92 
Similar separatist rumblings have recently come from the Baltic States. 
In July 1993, local authorities in Narva and Sillanae in northeast Estonia 
conducted a referendum on whether the region should become autonomous. 
Ninety-eight percent of those voting - just over half the local population -
cast their ballots in favor of autonomy. The Estonian government called the 
vote unconstitutional, 93 but separatist feelings remain in Estonia and several 
other countries where they pose a threat to the stability of Russia and the 
entire region. 
The presence of significant numbers of non-Russians within the borders 
of the Russian Federation poses yet another threat to the nation's stability. 
Under communist rule, the political organization of the Russian Republic was 
similar to that of the Union. Although more than 80% of the Russian Fed-
eration was inhabited by ethnic Russians, there were twenty-one republics 
within its borders each named for a specific non-Russian nationality or na-
tionalities. In only five of these was the majority of the population made up 
of non-Russians. 94 In addition, there were many other smaller semi-autono-
mous regions also based on ethnicity. 
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When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, some feared that the Russian 
Federation itself might soon further disintegrate as a number of regions and 
republics expressed their desire to gain their political and economic indepen-
dence from Moscow. In November 1 991 , the Republic of Chechnya, located 
in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, declared itself no longer a part of 
the Russian Federation. Likewise, the Republics of Tatarstan and Tyva, as 
well as the Sverdlovsk Oblast - which has declared itself the Urals Republic 
have openly expressed their determination to gain more autonomy. 95 
Despite the frequent separatist rumblings from different parts of the 
Russian Federation, the dangers of any widespread disintegration have re-
ceded in recent years. The main factors that prevents many republics and 
autonomous regions from seeking complete independence are economic. 
Within the various republics and regions, there exists a great disparity as 
regards to geographical size, ethnic mix, availability of valuable resources, 
and standard of living. The republics with the greatest percentages of non-
Russians tend to be those which are least suited to make it on their own 
economically should they become completely independent from Moscow. 96 
In some cases, the Russian government has used this economic leverage 
to maintain its influence over former republics and regions. The ethnic re-
public of Tatarstan, whose leaders have long pushed for increased autonomy, 
recently signed a new power-sharing treaty with the Russian Federation. 97 
Tatarstan's efforts to gain full independence were hampered by its depen-
dence on raw material imports, especially refined oil products, from other 
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parts of the Russian Federation. At one point, Moscow threatened to shut 
off the pipelines that link Tatarstan, via Russia, to the outside world. 98 Given 
its extensive natural resources and industrial base, Russia has the ability to 
exert similar pressures on other neighbors. 
Future Relations 
A fear prevails that Russia's active pursuit of its economic and political 
interests could be a sign of its desire to regain control over its former empire. 
However, any efforts to do so, by either economic pressures or in the ex-
treme case military force, would be tragically counterproductive for Russia. 
The strength of nationalist pride in the newly independent countries 
would make them unlikely to peacefully submit again to Russia's control. 
Russian moves to restore the empire most probably would result in war, 
which would finish off the Russian economy and lead to unprecedented 
bloodshed and complete chaos. Furthermore, renewed tensions could cause 
the different republics to build their militaries, seek nuclear weapons, and 
court allies, thereby dotting Russia's immense borders with hostile neigh-
bors. 99 
The more plausible scenario is that Russia will try to develop a "sphere of 
influence" which includes the former republics but does not involve the 
political, economic, and ideological domination that was part of Soviet rule. 
This sphere of influence is likely to include a variety of relationships, given 
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the diverse political and economic status of the various former republics. 100 
Each relationship would present a different political, economic, ethnic, 
and military situation in which Russia's relative advantage would also vary. 101 
Exactly what those relationships will be is nearly impossible to pin down, 
given the continued turmoil in several of the successor states. Some have 
suggested that Russia needs to turn inward and concentrate on its own 
economic and political development. The legacy of communism, however, 
has left Russia with the remnants of a economic system based on interde-
pendence that will require it to maintain its interests in the former republics 
for some time to come. In addition, Russia continues to be burdened with a 
number of potentially explosive situations in its near abroad that cannot be 
ignored. External developments will continue to play an important part in 
influencing the progress of Russian reforms. 
Authoritarianism to Democracy 
Perhaps the most challenging of Russia's three transitions will be the 
move from authoritarian rule to a democratic form of government. Democ-
racy is a complex system which, to function properly, must be supported by 
a broad base of cultural values and democratic institutions. 102 All modern 
democracies have been developed slowly, institution by institution, over long 
periods of time. Russia has been expected to make its transformation virtu-
ally overnight. 
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Russia's Authoritarian Tradition 
History has shown that democracy is not easily planted in new places. 103 
The task has been especially difficult in Russia, where the people lack any 
real traditions of democratic government. Russia has taken several steps in 
moving toward democratic rule, including the adaptation of a new constitu-
tion in December 1993. Meanwhile, popular elections for the presidency, 
parliament, and local positions have given the Russian people their first expe-
riences with the democratic process. However, some signs indicate Russia 
may soon be moving backward, in the direction of authoritarian rule. 
Such a reversal should not be entirely surprising, given Russia's 
prerevolutionary and communist political culture. Its people have always lived 
in a society in which the state monopolized every activity. Nothing resem-
bling a democratic civil society has ever existed in Russia. To rule, Russian 
leaders have traditionally capitalized upon the people's lack of initiative. 104 
The creation of a new constitution is not very reassuring to those who 
point out the fact that both Russia and the Soviet Union have had some very 
democratic constitutions during the course of their histories. The problem is 
no ruler has ever really followed these constitutions. 105 
The majority of the Russian people have yet to fully demonstrate an 
acceptance of the democratic process and a willingness to become actively 
and constructively involved in it. The disastrous state of the economy has 
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been especially damaging to the legitimacy of the new democratic rule. 106 In 
some cities and regions, recent local elections were declared void because of 
low voter turnout. Reports also circulated that election results in several 
locations were altered, further weakening people's trust in the fairness of the 
system. 107 
Leaders, likewise, remain non-committal in their willingness to make 
sincere efforts toward the development of institutions essential to initiate 
new democratic traditions. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's actions have 
distanced him little from the authoritarianism that characterized Russia's past 
rulers. 
In 1993, Yeltsin used military force to overthrow the elected parliament 
and the constitutional system previously presented to the Russian people as 
the legitimate post- communist order. 108 This turn of events has been cited 
as the most obvious example of Yeltsin's willingness to consolidate his 
power through the use of force and revealed an unsettling dependence on 
the army. 109 
In addition, the president's decrees have dissolved the parliament and 
suspended what was the highest legal body in the land - the Constitutional 
Court. He has largely dismantled the system of local governments by doing 
away with the so-called soviets and dismissing provisional governors who 
disobeyed his orders, even though some had been popularly elected. 110 
Yeltsin also has authorized the organization of a new ministry for the 
purpose of combatting "anti-constitutional" activities. Similar organizations 
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exist in Germany and some other democratic nations, but Russians may take 
little comfort in this fact since their new ministry is to be organized largely by 
former KGB leaders. 111 Some have taken this and other actions as an indica-
tion that the re-establishment of a police state has already begun. 112 
The new Russian Constitution gives the president more powers than 
that of any other Western democracy. 113 Given Yeltsin's record of 
authoritarianism, however, some warn it would be a mistake to think his 
extensive new powers will be used to accelerate political and democratic 
reforms. 114 In fact, the defeat of reformist forces in the December 1993 
elections has lessened the president's enthusiasm for reform. Instead, he 
apparently is trying to avoid any serious political upheavals that could emerge 
in the wake of mass unemployment which may accompany reforms. 115 This 
stance is clearly indicated by Yeltsin's replacement of shock therapy Prime 
Minister Vegar Gaidar with Chernomydrin, a supporter of more gradual and 
state-controlled reforms. 116 
Given the current economic and social chaos, a period of authoritarian 
rule indeed may be needed to get reforms ontrack. But there is no guaran-
tee, particularly in light of Yeltsin's recent actions and Russia's traditions 
ofgovernment, that once started on this course, authoritarian rule would be 
short-lived or temporary. 
Barriers To Democracy 
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Critical in the long run may be the fact that Russia continues to lack the 
permanent institutions needed to create and sustain a democratic system of 
government. The struggle for power between the executive and legislative 
branches during the past two years has detracted from the government's 
development of proper foundations for democratic growth. 117 
The adoption of a new constitution was seen by many as a major step 
toward democracy. Modeled mainly after the constitutions of France and the 
United States, it guarantees individual freedoms and includes a division of 
powers by allowing the new Federal Assembly to serve as both a partner and 
a check on the power of the executive branch. 118 
However, the new constitution contains several controversial provisions 
that could cause conflicts in the near future. 119 Most significantly, the ex-
ecutive branch has been given some law-making powers in addition to those 
of the legislative branch, thus blurring the separation of powers. Such a 
setup will likely lead to a continuation of the war of laws between the execu-
tive and legislative branches that has characterized the early days of Russian 
democracy. 120 
The creation of a legitimate parliament is a key step on the road to demo-
cratic government. The parliament must be one that is aware of the concerns 
of the population and also is a partner in the reform process in order to pre-
vent an estrangement between the Russian people and the Russian authori-
ties. 121 
The recent announcement by the parliament of an amnesty for both the 
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leaders of the 1 991 coup attempt and the 1 993 disturbances is an example 
of the legislative body's willingness to challenge Yeltsin's power directly. 122 
The new Federal Assembly's relationship with Yeltsin and its ability to assert 
itself without challenging the basics of reform will be critical to the develop-
ment of Russian democracy. 123 
Political parties are needed to provide constructive opposition and mass 
support for certain ideas, yet the new constitution gives no explanation of 
the role of parties. Of the many political parties in Russia today, none has 
succeeded in establishing a regional base of support large enough to win 
elections. The fall of communism left Russia without a major, nationwide 
political organization . The new parties have yet to organize enough voter 
support to put any real direct pressure on the current government. Yeltin's 
own lack of a party has limited his ability to create mass support for his 
reforms. 124 
Furthermore, not enough time has elapsed for the development of any 
firm party discipline. Without such discipline, voters cannot be assured that 
leaders, once in office, will feel pressured to carry out their campaign prom-
ises. 125 Such a precarious relationship could cause a further decline in the 
people's faith in democratic norms and practices. 
The media, another key player in a democratic system, have not yet 
become an influential ingredient in the Russian political process. In demo-
cratic systems, the media are supposed to serve as a "watchdog" of the 
state , providing unbiased reporting and applying pressure on the government 
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when its actions stray from the interests of the people. 
In Russia today, the media continue to serve as a propaganda tool of the 
state. Many key journalists still see their jobs as providing support for one 
political force or another. The emergence of a independent and critical media 
has yet to occur. 126 
Even if Russia can surmount its authoritarian traditions long enough to 
build a working democracy, anti-democratic forces within the country con-
tinue to exist that may threaten further political and economic reforms. Dis-
content about the declining economic condition has greatly increased public 
support for group's offering more radical solutions to Russia's problems. 
Nationalist forces, some from the extreme right and others more moderate, 
have a viable chance to win support of the Russian people and take com-
mand of the country's political future. 127 
Neo-communist and nationalist parties did shockingly well in the 1 993 
December parliamentary elections, gaining considerable influence in the new 
Federal Assembly and further indicating that people have grown weary of 
reform. Just how much of this support was given in the form of a protest 
vote against Yeltsin and how much was sincere show of support for the 
extreme right is impossible to discern. Many experts, nevertheless, maintain 
the nationalist threat cannot be ignored. 128 
Of the many radical Red-Brown groups in Russia, the most visible of 
these opposition groups has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) led by 
the eccentric ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In the December 1993 
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parliamentary elections, the LOP won 25 percent of the vote. Zhirinovsky, 
initially portrayed as a buffoon, has skillfully used outrageous behavior and 
oratory to attract media attention. His simplistic and extremely vague solu-
tions to Russia's problems have been refreshing to many people tired of 
hearing about the intricacies of free-market capitalism and democratic gov-
ernment. 129 
The LOP rejects both communist and democratic reform and uses them 
as scapegoats, thus positioning itself as a savior with no responsibility for 
past failures or current problems. 130 The LOP supports an economic program 
that in many ways resembles Adolph Hitler's national socialism. Racism and 
expansionism have been the weapons of choice in Zhirinovsky's battle to win 
the hearts and minds of the Russian people. The LOP has blamed many of 
Russia's current problems on minority groups and has promised to create an 
ethnically pure Russian state in an effort to end the threat of anarchy. Race 
also figures prominently in Zhirinovsky's foreign policy. LOP leaders speak of 
the yellowing, reddening, and blackening of the world's population and de-
scribe the threat it poses to the white race. 13 1 
This racist strategy has been specifically designed to unite Russia's 
people in a struggle against common "enemies" - the most prominent of 
thorn being the United States, various racial groups, and the Jews. 
Zhirinovsky has proposed his own "final solution" to the Russian Jewish 
problem in which the emigration of Jews from Russia is accelerated and their 
influence over the country's economy and media are reduced. However, the 
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LDP's policy would not be so humane in dealing with Zionists. 132 
Most threatening to the outside world is Zhirinovsky' s blatant expansion-
ism. If given power, Zhirinovsky promised the return of a dictatorship to 
restore the nation's superpower status. He has called the creation of the CIS 
treaty "an act of treason" and has promised to restore Russia to its former 
glory within the frontiers of 1900. Not only does he advocate regaining the 
republics, but also taking Finland, Poland, and even Alaska! Zhirinovsky has 
also promised a "push to the south" to eliminate the growing Islamic threat 
from Russia's southern borders. 133 
The LDP's active recruitment of military support has been particularly well 
received among the ranks of enlisted men and lower ranking officers. 
Zhirinovsky has promised to restore the might and prestige of the Russian 
Army, an idea so appealing to the military that Yeltsin attributed one- third of 
its vote to the LDP. 134 
Since 1991, the Russian military has suffered from low morale, low pay, 
housing shortages, and a drastic reduction of funds for weapons. Some 
units in the former republics have had to become completely self-supporting. 
While the military currently continues to support Yeltsin, it remains an omi-
nous figure in the Russian political picture. 135 
The greatest danger of the nationalists and other radicals may be that 
they are deflecting the energies of the nation from where they are most 
needed - coping with the real dangers and the immense work of reconstruc-
tion .136 If economic and social conditions would suddenly take a turn for the 
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worse, Zhirinovsky could come to power in the 1996 elections. Although it 
is unclear exactly what he would do in such a position, many believe it 
would be disaster for Russia and possibly the rest of world. 
Arguments Against A Return To Authoritarian Rule 
Several factors serve to lessen the likelihood of any return to fascism or 
other forms of oppressive authoritarian rule in Russia. A certain nostalgia for 
a return to the strict order of communism does exist among many Russians. 
In general, however, Russians have displayed such a strong aversion to 
fascist rule that for them to submit to it again - at least when they are 
enjoying some degree of social, economic and political stability - seems 
improbable. Memories of Nazism and the destruction of World War II are still 
recent for enough Russians to forestall any widespread acceptance of fas-
cism.131 
More significantly, like the reformers, the extreme right is fragmented and 
has been weakened by bitter internal disputes and dissention. 138 The com-
munists and anti- communist nationalists represent the main wings of the 
movement, but they are united only by their rejection of Yeltsin's reforms. 
They have major differences of opinion about both the meaning of Russian 
history and the proper model for the future. They have yet to progress be-
yond negativism to develop a coherent, workable agenda. 139 
The extremists, including the LOP, suffer from a lack of concrete pro-
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grams or leaders, outside of Zhirinovsky, capable of gaining mass support. 
Even Zhirinovsky's popularity seems to be waning as the economy shows 
signs of leveling out and he continues to fail to capitalize on his earlier suc-
cesses. 
The future of democratic reforms in Russia will hinge heavily upon the 
outcome of the 1996 presidential elections. By concentrating power in the 
hands of the president, the Russian Constitution makes it possible for one 
leader to have a significant influence on determining the nation's policies. 140 
Moreover, it will be necessary to overcome the nation's deep-rooted authori-
tarian traditions by working to create viable democratic institutions to ensure 
the creation of a democratic Russia. 
CONCLUSION: The Challenges Of Triple Revolution 
Given the tremendous challenges associated with each of the three revo-
lutions described in this paper, it is no wonder that Russia has experienced 
significant problems and outright chaos in recent years. The great extent to 
which the different transformations are interdependent upon one another 
only makes it harder to fathom how Russia will manage to sufficiently ac-
complish any of them in the near future. 
The possible scenarios are endless. Economic reforms could be reversed 
if the 1 996 elections place Russia under the rule of a leader opposed to 
further change. In turn, progress toward the development of democratic 
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institutions could be limited if a worsening economic and social situation 
creates mass support for more Draconian solutions to Russia's problems. 
Moreover, the escalation of ethnic conflicts in the near abroad or civil war 
sparked by separatist movements could engulf Russia and the former repub-
lics in wars that would set back further economic and political reforms and 
possibly lead to bloodshed on a massive scale. 
In studying Russia today, it is much easier to evaluate the effects of 
communist rule as they pertain to current problems and issues than it is to 
make any accurate assessment of the current economic or political situation. 
Two conflicting viewpoints surface with each of the three transitions men-
tioned . The more optimistic view implies that the main elements of a market 
economy and a democratic system have been introduced, political stability 
has been more or less achieved, and the future will include continued demo-
cratic reforms, even if they are conducted at a slower pace. The second, 
and more pessimistic, view holds that the reform process has been a com-
plete failure and Russia is once again headed in the direction of a command 
economy and authoritarian rule. Given the current information available, both 
positions cannot be entirely substantiated. 
The purpose of this paper has been to identify some of the more impor-
tant challenges that face Russia in completing its triple transformation. 
Events related to them that have yet to fully unfold will determine Russia's 
course and along with it the world's. 
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SECTION I ~ THE HISTORY 
============================================================= 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to really understand the great changes that 
have taken place in Russia and the other countries in this 
region todayJ you will need to know about what hos happened 
in the past. During this century (the 1900s)J this region 
has been the scene of many important events that have shaped 
today's situation. 
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How was the Soviet Union created? 
Why were more than 40 million Soviet people killed 
between 1930 and 1945? 
What was the Cold War? How did it threaten the safety 
of the whole world? 
============================================================ 
THE CZARS & THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE (1900-1914) 
Before 1900/ Russia was the center of a huge empire 
ruled by a series of kings called Czars. From the 1600s 
until about 1900/ Russian Czars conquered the lands and 
peoples around Russia. The Russian Empire included most of 
the territory that later became part of the Soviet Union. 
By the early 1900s/ most people in Russia were poor 
peasant formers. At the same time/ the Czars lived a life of 
luxury. The Czars made few efforts to improve the lives of 
the people and used force to stop any protests against the 
government. 
PERSIA 
I< >I 14s2 
I l1ses 
~1689 a Present Boundary of Commonwealth of lr:idependent States 
Russia's rulers slowly built a great emprie by conquering 
surrounding lands. 
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WORLD WAR ·& REVOLUTION (1914-1917) 
In 1914J Russia entered World War I and fought against 
Germany. The Russian Army was badly beatenJ and millions of 
Russian soldiers were killed in combat. Life in Russia 
became more and more unbearable as the war dragged on. By 
1917J the Russian people had enough . Food shortages became 
more seriousJ and riots and mass protests broke out in St. 
Petersburg and other cities. 
Russian soldiers in St. Petersburg refused orders to 
fire on the protesters. Unable to stop the growing unrestJ 
Czar Nicholas II abdicated (quit) and was replaced by a group 
of leaders from the DumaJ the Russian parliament . The new 
government decided to continue the war against GermanyJ but 
Russia continued to lose. 
In November 1917J a small group of communist 
revolutionaries called the Bolsheviks took control of the 
government in St. Petersburg. The Bolsheviks were led by 
Vladimir Lenin. The Bolsheviks quickly made peace with the 
Germans and got Russia out of Wo rl d War I. 
Lenin had studied the wri t ings of Karl MarxJ a German 
who had first developed t he idea of communism. Lenin wanted 
t o create a country where the workers shared the nation ' s 
resources and received only what they needed to live. 
It was to be one of the greatest experiments in government 
the world had ever seen. 
.. 
'l 
Lenin (left) and Stal in (r ight ) we re t he f irst two ru lers of 
t he Soveit Union. 
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CIVIL WAR & THE SOVIET UNION (1918-1922) 
Not everybody in Russia agreed with the BolsheviksJ who 
later renamed themselves the communists. From 1918 until 
1921J a bitter civtl war raged across the country as the 
communists (the Reds) fought to keep control of the 
government. They were opposed by the anti-communists (the 
Whites). Millions died in Russia during this war from famine 
and disease. 
The Reds won the civil war and in 1922 declared the 
creation of a new country called the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR). The Soviet Union was the world's 
first communist nation. 
REIGN OF TERROR (1924-1939) 
In l924J Lenin diedJ and Joseph Stalin became the 
dictator of the Soviet Union. Stalin was one of the most 
cruel leaders ever to live. He used fear and violence to 
force people to follow communism. During the 1930sl an 
estimated 20 million Soviets were killed as part of Stalin's 
effort to get rid of anyone who mignt oppose him or try to 
overthrow him. Millions were sent to labor camps in Siberia 
or simply executed for the slightest of reasons,or for no 
reason at all. 
WORLD WAR II (1939-1945) 
World War II began in 19391 and in 1941 Germon dictator 
Adolph Hitler ordered his armies to invade Russia. The 
German Army came close to capturing Moscowl but eventuallY1 
the Red Army pushed the Germans bock into Germany and 
captured Berlin to end the war. Over 20 million Russians 
were killed in the fightingJ and much of the nation's 
farmland and industries were destroyed. 
Russian soldiers in action during the Bottle of Stalingrad 
in 1942. 
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World War II is the most remembered event in Russia's 
history. Most cities have huge monuments honoring those who 
died in what Russians call the 0 Great Patriotic War." Despite 
its heavy lossesJ t~e Soviet Union came out of the warJ along 
with the United StatesJ as one of the world's most powerful 
countries. 
THE COLD WAR 
The United States and the Soviet Union were allies 
against Germany during the war, but when the war endedJ they 
quickly became bitter enemies. The Russians took control of 
most of Eastern Europe. The U.S. protested but could do 
nothing to stop them. This was the beginning of the Cold 
War, the period of great distrust between the U.S. and the 
USSR. It was called the Cold War because the two countries 
never actually fought each other. 
THE ARMS RACE (1949-1970) 
In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic 
bomb. In 1952, the U.S. tested its first hydrogen bomb, and 
the Soviet Union quickly developed one too. H-Bombs, as they 
were called, were thousands of times more powerful than the 
first atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War 
I I . 
In 1957, the Soviets tested their first Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM). ICBMS could carry nuclear bombs to 
targets thousands of miles away. The entire world was soon 
threatened with total nuclear destruction! 
During which time 
period did the U.S. 
and USSR make the 
most nuclear 
weapons? 
Both the Soviet Union and the United States were afraid 
that the other would get more weapons and gain on advantage. 
As a result, each country began to build' more conventional 
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and nuclear weapons. This buildup of weapons was called t he 
arms race. For more than 30 yearsJ the world feared the 
outbreak of a war between the two superpowers which might 
become a nuclear war. By the 1960sJ each side had more than 
enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times 
over. 
In October 1962J a nuclear wa r almost started when t he 
USSR tried to put missiles in CubaJ just 90 miles from 
Florida. American President John F. Kennedy demanded t he 
missiles be removed . Afte r a few days of incredibl e 
tensionJ the Soviets backed downJ and the world breathed a 
sigh of re lief. The Cuban Missile Crisis was overJ but t he 
th reat of nuc l ear destruction continued to hang over the 
globe well into the 1980s. 
Air photograph shows Soviet missiles in CuboJ Oct. 1962 . 
RECENT HISTORY 
Duri ng t he 1970sJ relat ions between the two count r ies 
improved . When t he Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan i n 1979J 
howeverJ t ensions once again increased. To protest t he 
invasionJ the United States refused to send its athletes to 
the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. The Soviets responded in 
1984 by boycott ing the Los Angeles Olympics. The Olympic 
boycotts symbolized a renewed bit t erness be t ween the two 
nations as the arms race continued and the threat of nuclear 
war continued to hang over the earth . 
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In 1985J a new leader emerged who would change the 
Soviet Union -- and the world -- forever. His name was 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev was a communistJ but he knew 
that communism was not working and it had to be changed in 
order to survive. 
In 1986J he introduced plans to reform the economy and 
government of the Soviet Union. The changes he tried to make 
between 1986 and 1991 helped lead to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. We will discuss Gorbachev's reforms more in 
later sections of this unit. 
Gorbachev's reforms began the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
THE BREAKUP OF THE SOVIET UNION 
In 1991J seemingly overnightJ one of the world's most 
powerful and feared nations ceased to exist . Just a few 
years eorlierJ many people never would have believed this 
could happen. The remainder of this unit will help you 
understand the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed and 






( 2 ) 
(3) 
( 4) 
Explain the causes and effects of the Russian 
Revolution. 
How did World War II effect the Soviet Union? 
Describe the beginnings of the arms race. 
When did the Soviet Union collapse? Why is this such 




--------------------------------------------------------~------------------------------------------------------------------allies ~ Countries that help each other in times of war or 
peace. 
boycott -- To refuse to buy or use something as a form of 
protest. 
communl.sm --- .ti. system of government developed by Karl 
Marx (below at left) which all property is owned in common. 
conventional weapons -- Non-nuclear weapons such as riflesJ 
tanksJ airplanesJ etc . 
czars -- Kings who ruled the Russian Empire before the 1917 
Revolution. Nicholas II (below at right) was the last. 
dictator -- A ruler who hos total control over a country and 
usually rules by force. 
empire -- A group of c0untriesJ statesJ or land under the 
control of one ruler or government . 
ICBM -- An acronym for Intercontinental Ballistic MissilesJ 
missiles that can carry nuclear wa rreads thousands of miles 
(between continents). 
nuclear weapons -- Weapons of mass destruction that come 
from the release of atomic energy . 
parliament -- The law-making part of some governments . 
Members are elected by the people. 
peasant -- A poor farmer. 
reform -- To make a change for the better. 
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-----------------------------------~-----~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------SECTION II ~ THE PEOPLE & CULTURE 
============================================================ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Former Soviet Union is a huge region covering over 
one-sixth of the earth's surface and extending across 11 time 
zones. Today it is made up of the 15 countries that were 
once part of the Soviet Union. It is also a region of great 
diversity; both in terms of landscapes and people. 
There are more that 150 different ethnic group living in 
the region today, each with its own special culture. 
However, this great diversity has caused many problems that 





























(1) Why are there so many ~ifferent ethnic groups in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union? 
(2) Why is there fighting between ethnic groups in many parts 
of the former Soviet Union today? 
Russian peacekeeping troops in Azerbaijan. 
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THE SOVIET REPUBLICS 
Before 1917J the Russian Empire was made up of many 
different ethnic groupsJ whose lands had been conquered by 
the czars. After the revolutionJ control of the Russian 
Empire's territory was passed to t he communists. Some areas 
tried to declare their independenceJ but in Georgia and other 
plocesJ the communists used force to make the people become 
port of the Soviet Union. 
The communists divided the Soviet Union into smaller 
regions called republics. When the Soviet Union broke up in 
1991J there were 15 different republics. Each republic got 
its name from its main ethnic group. For instancel 
Kazakhstan was inhabited mainly by Kazakhs. However 1 each 
republic hcd many different groups living within its borders. 
Russia alone has over 39 different ethnic groups ! This 
mixing of ethnic groups has caused problems that continue to 
haunt Russia and the former republics -tbday~ -
o National capitals 
• Other cities 
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Some of the ethnic groups wi thin the region. 
10 
RUSSIA 
Russia was the largest republic; and Russians made up 
almost half of the population. Russians held most of the 
important positions in the Communist Porty and the Soviet 
government1 and Moscow was the capital city of the Soviet 
Union. 
Throughout i t s historyl Soviet leaders tried to 
0 Russify 0 the republics by moving many Russian people into 
the different republics to live and work. These people 
spread Russian culture to all parts of the Soviet Union. 
Russian was named the official language of the Soviet Union1 
and over the years1 many groups lost much of their own 
cultural identity. 
1 R~:;.-sitt -----------------.., 
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Ethnic makeup of Russia. 
ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
The communists paid l itt le attention to ethnic 
differences when they created the borders for the different 
republi cs during the 1920s . Small numbers of some ethnic 








minorities. Often times, groups were minorities in countries 
that included their traditional enemies. Under communist 
rule, fighting between ethnic groups was prevented only by 
the presence of the Soviet Army. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in a wave 
of ethnic violence across the former empire as hostile ethnic 
groups try to settle old disputes. Many of these disputes 
are over territory and borders. Ethnic fighting and civil 
wars are perhaps the greatest threat to the stability of this 
vast region. 
HOT SPOTS 
One of the most brutal conflicts has been in Azerbaijan. 
Nogorno-Karabokh is a small region inside Azerbaijan near the 
border with Armenia (see map below). However, most of the 
people that live in Nagorno-Karabakh are Armenians. Stalin 
gave this area to Azerbaijan during the 1920s. Armenia 
thinks this region belong~ to it~ country, but Azerbaijan 
disagrees. Armenians living in Nogorno-Karabakh hove not 
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Nagorno-Karabakh is inhabited by mostly Armenians. 
Since 1989~ there has been much fighting between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh and other 




problem in Georgia; Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; as well as 
in smaller regions of many of the former republics. 
Russia has sent peace-keeping troops to several regions 
in order to prevent these conflicts from spreading. Some 
people have accused the Russians of trying to reconquer their 
old ernpireJ but Russia hos little choice but to try to keep 
order in the regionJ because further fighting could threaten 
its own efforts to rebuild its economy and government. 
Locations of ethnic fighting. 
As we shall see in later unitsJ ethnic violence is a 
serious problem in many other parts of the world todayJ 
including Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
RUSSIANS ABROAD 
To complicate matters even moreJ nearly 25 million 
Russ ians are still scattered throughout the former Soviet 
republics. In UkraineJ KozakhstanJ and the Baltic countriesJ 
Russians make up a large percentage of the popu lation. These 
ethnic Russians find themselves living in foreign nationsJ 
where they are not always accepted by other ethnic groups. 
The Russian Army has remained in Lithuania and several 
other republics t o try and protect its citizens there. The 
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Russian government wants other countr ies to guarantee the 
rights of ethnic Russians and allow them to live peacefully. 
Russia cannot afford to bring large numbers of ethnic 
Russians back home because it lacks jobs and housing for 
tnem. Nevertheless, thousands have already returned . 
Homewardbound 
Their privileged status gone with the collapse of the 
so·Jiet u1·,ion, ethnic Russians are returning to 
Russia in droves from almost every former republic. 
Only Belarus and Ukraine experienced a small net 
influx of ethnic Russians from 1991 to 1992. 
Net migration of ethnic 
Russians from former 
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Ethnic Russians moving back to Russia. 
NATIONALISM ationalism means having great pride in one's country or 
nationality . Since the breakup of the soviet Union, the 
people in most of the region's new countries are very proud 
of their country's independence. In addition, people living 
in several smaller regions within the former republics have 
begun to feel they should become independent countries too 
and want to control their own affairs. Chechenya and Tatorstan ore two smaller ethnic republics 
located within Russia. In recent yearsJ each has expressed 
a desire to become more independent from Russia. For the 
momentJ both regions still depend heavily on Russia for their 
supplies of oil and other vital resources, making it unlikely 
that they will break away any time soon. In Georgia, rebels 
in a region called Abkhazia are fighting to become a separate 
country. 
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There is still the danger that Russia and some of the 
other former republics could one day split into dozensJ if 
not hundredsJ of smaller countries. Such a division would 
greatly increase the chances for more ethnic disputes and 
violence. 
Nationalism is not limited to smaller ethnic groups. 
Russian politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky have used 
nationalism to win the support of voters by promising 
to restore Russian control of the former republics and to 
make Russia a world µower again. 
CULTURE/RECREATION 
Until the 1980sJ the government tightly controlled all 
forms of culture and entertainment in the Soviet Union. 
Communist officials censored books,. ploysJ moviesJ music,. and 
other art forms. Soviets/ whose art or literature criticized 
the government/ were often imprisoned or exiled. 
Newspapers were controlled by the communists too. The 
official newspaper 1·ms celled Pro~1da which means "the truth." 
Most Soviets found thia ti ·tle funny since the communists 
rarely told them the truth about what was happening in their 
country. 
Some people had televisions; but most programs were 
mostly government propagandaJ including many dull speeches by 
communist leaders . PlaysJ filrnsJ and books usually dealt 
with the great11ess of communism. All religion was banned 
because the communists wanted the people to be loyal only to 
the government. 
In 1986t Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policy of 
glasnost or 'openness." Government controls over the press 
were liftedJ and people were allowed to criticize the 
government for the first time since the Russian Revolution. 
They also were allowed to read books and see plays that had 
been banned by the communists. For the first timeJ many 
Russians learned the truth about the horrors of the Stalin 
era and other events in Soviet history. 
TodayJ people across the former Soviet Union enjoy a 
wide variety of recreational activities/ including chessJ 
dancing~ musicJ movies/ and sports like basketball/ hockeyJ 
and, most recently/ baseball. American rock music and 
clothing styles hove become popular among teen-agers. In 
additionJ each ethnic group enjoys its own distinct forms of 
recreation and entertainment. 
A DIVERSE REGION 
The former Soviet Union is one of the world's most 
ethnically diverse regions . The future of Russia and its new 
neighbors depends largely on how well these different ethnic 
groups and nationalities are able to live together and to 
cooperate in order to meet the many challenges that face 









How were ethnic groups divided by the communists? 
Why ore ethnic violence and nationalism in nearby 
countries problems for Russia? 
Many ethnic Russians still live in other countries that 
were once part of the Soviet Union. Why is this a 
problem today? 





censor -- To check communications before allowing them to 
become public and to hold back those viewed as unfavorable 
(ex: newspaper stories being checked by the government before 
publication). 
cultural identity -- A person's sense of belonging to a 
certain ethnic group or culture. 
diversity -- Differences among p~oplesJ regionsJ etc. Having 
mony different partsJ chorocteristicsJ qualities. 
exile -~ To punish a people by forcing them to leave their 
country and live somewhere else. 
hostile -- To act with anger or hatred toward another person 
or group. 
minority -- A group living in a country that has less 
power than the main group. A minority is not always the 
smallest groups. 
nationalism - To have great pride in one's country . 
politicians -- One who is actively involved in politics. 
One who holds or runs for public office (ex: mayorJ 
presidentJ lawmaker). 
propaganda -- Communications used to persuade people to 
think a certain way. Often timesJ information is twisted or 
exaggerated to influence people a certain way. 
stability -- Situation in a country when the economy is 
doing well and there ore no civil wars or other oroblems 
to disrupt the governing of the country. · 
16 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECTION III ~ THE ECONOMY 
---------------------------------------------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION \ 
The future of Russia and the other new countries of this 
region depends largely on how well their governments are able 
to solve the tremendous economic problems created by 70 years 
of communism. Lenin and the communists set out to create a 
countr¥ in which there was no unemploymentJ povertyJ and the 
nation s resources were shared by the people. it was a nice 


























Some foreign businessesJ like this Moscow McDonald'sl have 
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Why did the Soviet economic system fail? 
Identify and explain the current economic problems and 
challenges facing Russia and the other new countries in 
this region. 
Describe the serious environmental problems facing this 
region today. 
============================================================ 
THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM 
TodayJ Russia and the other countries in this region 
are facing many economic problems. To understand these 
problemsJ you will need to know a little bit about how the 
communist economic system worked and why it failed in the 
Soviet Union. 
The Soviet economic system hod two main features. 
FirstJ there was no private property. All businessesJ shopsJ 
factoriesJ transportotionJ communicotionsJ and industries 
were owned by the Soviet government. During the 1930sJ 
farmers were forced to combine their land into large 
government-owned farms Galled collectives. 
A collective farm in Georgia. 
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SecondJ. the government strictly controlled all parts of 
the country's economy. Special planning committees decided 
what would be produced on farms and in factoriesJ how much 
workers would be paid, and how much products would cost. 
Forms and factories produced goods which were then sold bock 
to the government. Government planners then decided how to 
distribute the products to the different cities. 
This economic system is very different from capitalism, 
the economic system used in the United States and other non-
communist countries. In a capitalist, or free-market system, 
people run their own farms and businesses. The types of 
products they make depend on what items people wont, and the 
prices people pay depend on the amounts available. For 
example, a product that is hard to find and a lot of people 
want will cost more. In business, this system is called the 
lq~ of supply and demand. Competition between different 
businesse·s helps· ins·ur~ qUc:Jl'i tY goods. · 
~ . . . .. ·. ' . 
PROBLEMS WfTH THE SYSTfM 
Over the yedrs; government-r·un iridust~ies cind farming 
proved to b~ very fheffici~nt. Ev~rybody.in the So~iet Union 
was guaranteed a Job, but farmers and factory workers hod no 
reason to work hard since they got paid the same no matter 
how much they produced . People had little pride in their 
~ork be~ause they weren't working for themselves. -
Factory workers were pushea to meet quotas but were 
rarely rewarded for their extra w0rk. Since all decisions 
were made by the gov~rnment planner$, workers had little 
reason to offer suggestion~ as to how to improve things. 
Factories got resources Gnd suppli9s free from the 
government, so managers did not core if materials were wasted 
or used inefficiently. 
From the beginning, Soviet factories produced mainly 
capital goodsJ like machinery for factories or form 
equipment. As a result, consumer goods -- like toilet paper, 
soap, shoes, toothpaste, television, and automobiles -- were 
very hard to get. The communists were not too concerned 
about how comfortably their people lived. They felt it was 
more important to build industry and their armed forces. 
By the mid-1960s, the Soviet economy began to stop 
growing. While the United States and other western nations 
were improving their technology, the Soviet Union's factories 
quickly were becoming outdated. Because of inefficient 
farming, the Soviet Union had to import much of its food 
supply. These problems eventually led to the collapse of the 
Soviet economy. 
ARMS RACE 
The arms race was one of the most important reasons for 
the collapse of the Soviet economy during the late 1980s. 
During the arms race, the Soviet Union spent more than 25 
percent of its wealth and many of its resources on defense. 
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This setup took money that could have been used to help 
improve agricultureJ industry; and transportation. It also 
prevented the government from producing more consumer goods 
for the people. 
HARDSHIPS 
The problems of the communist economic system mode life 
hard for most Soviet people. Shortages of consumer goods 
forced people to wait in long lines for many hours ct 
government stores to get the items they needed . It was not 
uncommon for a person to have to wait over eight hours to get 
a single item, such as milk, meat, or a pair of shoes. In 
most stores, the shelves were always nearly empty. For 
Soviet people, waiting in line for hours every day was a way 
of life. 
People waiting in line to buy shoes and the empty shelves 
that often greeted them. 
Many people turned to the illegal black market to get 
t he things they needed. Black mar keteers sold consumer goods 
for high prices and mode big profits. Black marketeers 
usually smuggled these goods in from other countries or stole 
them from government industries. 
Housing was another problem since the gove rnment did not 
allow people to own their own homes. Most people lived in 
crowded government apartment buildings; where they often had 
to shore a single kitchen or bathroom wi th several families. 
In MoscowJ there was an 18-year waiting list to get your 
own apartment' Given all these problems; it is no wonder 




THE SYSTEM FAILS 
The Soviet economy began to fall apart during the 
1980s. In 1985J Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policy of 
PerestroikaJ a series of reforms that included plans to 
improve and modernize the Soviet economy. In RussionJ 
perestroika means "restructuring." Gorbachev hoped to 
increase the production of consumer goods and to improve the 
quality of Soviet products. 
Gorbachev did not wont to get rid of communism but to 
improve it slowly. NeverthelessJ most people demanded 
quicker change than Gorbachev's reform~ which failed to 
improve the economy. By the late 1980s l shortages of food 
and consumer goods become worse than ever because the 
nation's systems of transportation and production had begun 
to completely break down. The failure of the communist 
economic system was one of the most important reasons for the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. 
COMMUNISM TO CAPITALISM 
Today/ Russia and tne other former republics are trying 
to make a quick change from a communist·economic system to a 
free-market economy. M9st of the -world's developed countries 
took many years to build their economic systems. After 70 
years of communismJ Russia must build a whole new economic 
system from scratch aver~lght. It has not been easy. 
A street vendor in Moscow. 
The Russian government must decide how to switch the 
ownership of businessesJ factoriesJ equipment/ and other 
resources from the government to private cit izens. The 
process of privatization is taking place very slowly. 
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·"....__ 
ownership of most small shops and businesses hos already been 
changed, but many larger factories and industries are still 
owned by the government. Much of Russia's farmland is still 
organized in collective farms. 
Change has been slow, but some progress is being made. 
Today, in Moscow and other cities, the streets are full of 
entrepreneurs, people selling everything from shoes to 
souvenirs of communism. However, the Russian government is 
still trying to encourage people to start more and larger 
businesses to provide even more basic goods and services for 
the people. 
The United States and other countries hove promised to 
help the Russians improve their economy. Some foreign 
businesses have already opened in Russia, and economic 
experts have been sent to teach Russians how c free-market 
system works. The world knows that the chances for world 
peace will be much better if Russia's economy develops 
successfully. 
PAINFUL CHANGE 
In 1992, Russian · President Boris Yeltsin introduced his 
plan to change the Russi on economy to a free·-mar·ket system. 
His plan called for the guick change of tne Russian economy 
through what was called 'shock therapy." This sudden change 
to capitalism hos caused even more hardships for the Russian 
people. 
In 1992, the Russian government allowed merchants and 
industries to set the prices for tl1~i; or-m goods. Instead of 
becoming more affordable 1 prices fo r consumer goods hove gone 
way up. There ore me re goods available, but they are too 
expensive for most people to buy . 
Inflation hos affected other parts of the former Soviet 
Union as well. In the UkraineJ o good cut of meat can cost 
almost half the overage worker ' s monthly pay. (The average 
person in the Ukraine makes less than $2 per year!) Many 
people are struggling to survive. 
Now that forms and industries are no longer controlled by 
the government, many peopl e may lose t heir jobs. Homeless 
people and beggars are appearing on the streets of Moscow, 
St. Petersburg/ and other cities. Many people are worr i ed 
about the fut ure. One sign of this fear is the fact that 
marriage rates in Russia have dropped noti ceably during the 
last two years. 
CRIME & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Harsh economic conditions in Russia have helped create o 
number of serious social problems. There has been a great 
increase in violent crime, especially among teen-agers. The 
murder rote has doubled, and organized crime gangs have token 
control of many new businesses. Merchants must pay these 
gangs a large part of their profits for "protection." 
These gangs also hove helped smuggle many of Russia's 
valuable mineral resources out of the country and have sold 
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them for huge profits. While a few Russians have become 
extremely rich during the change to capitalism1 most remain 
poor. Russia's po~ice force does not yet have the manpower 
or equipment to do much to stop organized crime. 
Health care is another huge problem in Russia today. 
Many women cannot afford proper diets1 leadin~ to even more 
unhealthy children being born. Hospitals don t have enough 
rooms/ beds/ medicines 1 or properly trained doctors to care 
for the people. In fact 1 Russia ' s population actually has 
begun to decrease in recent years. These problems are mode 
even more serious by the fact that building a strong free-
market economy requires o large and healthy work force. 
THE FUTURE 
Most Russians were willing to accept the hardships that 
they knew 't-1ould come vd th trying to set up a fr·ee-market 
economy 1 but many ore growing tired of waiting for things to 
get better. Since 1993{ the Russian government hos begun to 
abandoned hshock therapy' in favor of slower reforms. Some 
people even think that the government should take control of 
the economy again to ~oke things better for the people. 
At this moment/ Russia ' s future is very uncertain. 
HoweverJ changing economic systems takes time/ and the 
Russian economy is showing some signs of improvement. 
Ru~sia's c0rrent problems may be Just ugrowing poinsu that 
come with building a brand-new economic system. 
===================~==============~=~======================= 






Explain the difference between a communist economic 
system and o free-market system. 
Identify and explain the problems that caused the failure 
of the Soviet economic system. 
Describe the challenges facing Russia today as it makes 
the change to a free-market economy. How have the U.S. 
and other countries tried to help? 





SPECIAL REPORT/THE ENVIRONMENT 
===================~========================================= 
The end of communist rule has revealed another gr.eat 
challenge for the countries of the former Soviet Union 
In their drive to become an industrial powerJ the communists 
hod absolutely no laws to protect the environment from 
pollution by industries. 
Many factories dumped toxic wastes and chemicals 
directly into riversJ lokesJ seas~ and the air -- without any 
concern for the effects the toxins might have on plantsJ 
animals, and people. As a resultJ the number of children 
born with birth defects has increased dramatically in recent 
yearsJ and many people in industrial areas suffe r from lung 
diseases and other sicknesses. 
Soviet leaders were especially careless with nuclear 
energy . In 1986, human error caused an explosion at the 
Chernobyl nuclear plant that sent a huge radioacti ve cloud 
Environmental damage in the former Soviet Union. 
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into the atmosphere. At least 5JOOO people were killedJ 
while many more continue to die from cancer and other related 
ailments. Thousands of square miles of land in Ukraine and 
Belarus were contaminated by radiation. 
Even more terrifying is the fact that most of the 
nuclear power plants still operating in the former Soviet 
Union are outdated and in poor condit ion. There could be 
another Chernobyl in the near future! 
During the Cold WorJ the Soviets carelessly conducted 
nuclear tests and exposed thousands of people to deadly 
radiation. In additionl radioactive wastes were simply 
dumped into the sea. The Soviet government kept ali this 
secret fr om the people and kept no recordsl so there is no 
telling how serious the damage is. 
Industrial pollution has nearly destroyed much of the 
region's once-beautiful environment. Many acres of 
forestland have been destroyed by acid rainJ while two of the 
region 's largest bodies of water have been severely 
contaminated by poll ution and careless development. 
Lake Baikal, loca~ed tn eastern RussiaJ is the world's 
deepest lake. However~ nearby factories have severely 
pol luted the lake and killed many of its fish and wildlife . 
In KazokhstanJ water from rivers feeding into the Aral Sea 
was drained to provide irrigation for cotton crops. However 1 
so much water has been taken that nearly half of the lake, 
once the size of West Virginia, is now completely dried up. 
The dried-up Aral Sea . 
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These are only two examples of the many environmental 
horror stories now being revealed across the former Soviet 
Union. Although many more people are now working to save the 
environment in Russia and the other former republics, most 





block market -- The illegal buying and selling of goods. 
capital -- Wealth in the form of money, property, or 
equipment that can be invested in a certain business. 
capital goods -- Products used by industries to make other 
goods (ex: machinery). 
capi talisrn/free-market 5ystem -- An economic system in ~'lhich 
businesses are owned by individuals instead of by the 
government. 
collective farms -- Large farms in which all land, equipmentJ 
and livestock is shared by many people. 
consumer goods -- Produsts bought ~Y people for personal 
use {ex: clothing). 
entrepreneurs -- People who start and operate their own 
businesses. 
inflation -- High prices for goods or services. 
supply and demand -- Rule of business that helps determine 
what things are produced and how much they cost. The supply 
of o product depends on the demand for it . The price of o 
product depends on its supply. For example, if there is less 
of a certain product and the demand for it is highJ it will 
cost more because it is harder to find. 
technology -- The methods cind materials used in scienceJ 
trade, and industry. 
quotas -- A fixed amount . 
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SECTION IV ~ POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------·-------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION 
Since 19911 Russia has taken several important steps 
toward creating a more democratic system of government. 
Russian people have been allowed to choose their president 
and lawmakers; while enjoying more personal freedom than they 
have ever known. The future of democratic change in the 
region will depend heavily on events taking place during the 
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How has government in Russia changed since the fall of 
communism in 1991? 
Describe the problems and challenges facing Russia as it 
tries to create a democratic system of government. 
Explain the issues surrounding the armed forces of the 
former Soviet Union. 
==========================~================================== 
THE PARTY 
From 1922 to 1991J the Soviet Union was ruled by the 
Communist Party. The Communist Party was the only political 
party allowed in the country. Although only about 9 percent 
of the Soviet people were allowed to Join the partyJ its 
members held the most important positions in the government 
and the military. Party members mode all of the impbrtant 
decisions about the economy and other matters. 
Communist leaders boasted of equality for allJ but 
corruption was a big problem in the Soviet system. Many 
communist officials Used their positions to get the best 
housingJ foodJ and other luxury items unavailable to most 
people. · 
LIMITS ON FREEDOM 
The Communist Party was determined to hold on to its 
power at all costs . For many yearsJ people could not openly 
criticize the communist government without fear of being 
punished. Many dissidents were imprisoned or forced to leave 
tne country. Tne communist secret police (KGB) kept a close 
watch on the activities of all Soviet citizens. 
Soviet citizens were not allowed to travel outside of 
the countryJ read foreign newspapersJ or watch foreign 
television programs . The communists knew that if Soviets 
sow how others in capitalist countries were livingJ they 
would be unhappy with communism. 
Education was also controlled by the communists. From 
the earliest agesJ Soviet children were taught to be loyal to 
the party. Communist youth groups, such as the Children of 
October and the Young PioneersJ were used to teach communist 
beliefs. School books left out anything bad about the 
history and government of the Soviets. Until 1989J the 
Soviet people had most aspects of their lives controlled by 
the Communist Party. · 
. GORBACHEV 
. The economic failures of the 1980s _caused many Soviets 
to openly question the qbility of the Communist Party to run 
the cou~try. ·We have alrea~~ learned how .Mikhail Gorbachev 
tried to save the communist system by mak.ing a series of 
reforms beginning in 1986. · 
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In addition to improving the economy/ Gorbachev wanted 
to make the government more democratic by toking away much of 
the Communist Party's power. In 1989/ he allowed people to 
vote in some local elections/ something Soviet citizens had 
not done since 1911! Most communists kept their positions/ 
but people were given a taste of democracy. 
In 1989/ Gorbachev allowed the countries of Eastern 
Europe to break free from the Soviet Union. He wanted to 
keep control of the Soviet republics, but his reforms had 
given many republics the courage to demand their own freedom 
from the Soviet Union. 
In 1990, the Baltic Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia) began to demand their independence. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union was beginning . 
THE NEW RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 
By 1990, the Communist Party hod lost much of its power 
and the people's respect. In 1991, a group of communists and 
KGB leaders feared that Gorbachev's reforms would destroy 
communism. In August, they took Gorbachev prisoner and tried 
to take over the government. · 
The people of Moscow took to the streets to protest. -
They built barricades around the Russian parliament building, 
where lawmakers led by Bor is Yeltsin opposed the takeover. 
The people were willi ng to risk their lives to keep the new 
freedoms they hod dreamed of for so long. The coup leaders 
ordered the army to attack the protesters, but the soldiers 
refusedJ and the coup fajled. 
Boris Yeltsin with former U.S. President George Bush. 
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Soon afterwardJ the Russian Parliament banned the 
Communist Party and took over its offices. All over the 
countryJ joyous people tore down statues of Lenin and other 
communist leaders. One by oneJ the republics declared their 
independence. The Soviet UnionJ once the most feared nation 
on earthJ was finished. 
Gorbachev had made important changes that led to the 
breakup of the Soviet UnionJ but he was criticized for 
wonting to continue communism. He was overshadowed by Boris 
Yeltsin, whose bravery during the coup attempt won him the 
support of many Russians. In 1992J Yeltsin became the first 
freely elected President of Russia and promised tc make 
Russia a full democracy with a free-market economy. 
THE CIS 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed 
soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The CIS is 
made up of 11 of the former Soviet republicsJ each of which 
has its own constitution and government. The Baltic 
Republics and Georgia refL1sed to Join the CIS because they 
did not wont to be influenced by the Russians any longer. 
The main purpose of the CIS is to encourage trade and 
other forms of cooperation among the member notions . Russia 
-- by reason of its large sizeJ populationJ and resources --
is the dominant force in the CIS. So farJ the CIS hos had 
little success in solving problems, such as ethnic disputesJ 
in the former republics. Its future is ·1n danger unless its 
member countries become more willing to work together to 
solve their common problems. 
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THE 11 REPUBLICS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
THE 4 REPUBLICS THAT DID NOT JOIN 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
Population Population 
(in millions, (in millions, 
according to according to 
Republic Capital 1990 census) Republic Capital 1990 census) 
-
1. Russia Moscow (148.0) I . Georgia Thilisi (5.5) 
2. Ukraine Kiev (51.8) 2. Lithuania Vilnius (3 .7) 
3. Uzbekistan Tashkent (20.3) 3. Latvia Riga (2.7) 
4. Kazakhstan Alma-A ta (16. 7) 4. Estonia Tallin (l.6) 
5. Byelarus Minsk (10.3) 
6. Azerbaijan Baku (7. 1) 
7. Tajikistan Dushanbe (5 .3) 
8. Moldova Kishinev (4.4) 
9. Kyrghyzstan Bishkik (4.4) 
10. Turkmenistan Ashkhabad (3.6) 
I I . Armenia Jerevan (3.3) 
The area that makes up what was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) is a mosaic of ethnic groupings and nationalities, 
With approximately 130 different languages. After the dissolution of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, this very diverse 
Population reacted with nationalistic fervor, and the 15 republics of the Soviet Union contended with the question of whether or not it 
was in their best interest to unite into a new union. Eleven did, into what is now called the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(C.I.S. ), with 4 choosing independence of the Commonwealth. . 




The former republics continue to be linked to Russia by 
economic ties. The communist economic system was designed so 
that the different republics depended on each other for 
different products. For examplel all the republics depended 
on Russia for their energy resources since it produced most 
of the country's oil and natural gasJ in addition to most of 
its lumber and steel. The Ukraine produced much of the 
Soviet Union's wheat. Factories in one republic often 
depended on raw materials from another to produce certain 
goods. 
When the republics first gained their independencel many 
of them wonted to break all ties with RussiaJ but they soon 
found t hemselves facing shortages of fuel and other 
resources . In recent monthsJ Belarusl Ukraine, and other 
republics have moved to establish closer ties with Russia . 
Some people fear that Russia will use its economic power to 
recreate it~ ol~ empire. HoweverJ Russia has enough of its 
own probl ems to worry abou t and; most likelyl wi l l try to 
cooperate even more wi th its ne ignbors . 
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The Soviet Union traded mainly with other communist 
countries. 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
There have been historic changes in Russia over the last 
three yearsl but the futu re of Russia and the other countries 
in t he regioh · is st i ll ve ry much up in the ai r . 
In RussiaJ increasing economic hardships hove caused 
people to grow unhappy with Boris Yeltsin. Some people even 
began talking of a return to communism because at least then 
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there was order and people had enough to eat. In 1992, many 
Russians began to question the great powers that Yeltsin had 
given himself to improve the economy. Because of increasing 
pressure, Yeltsin has had to back off from his more radical 
reforms. 
In October 1993, members of the Russian parliament who 
opposed Yeltsin tried to take over the government. Yeltsin 
ordered the Russian Army to attack the parliament building 
where the rebels had assembled. Almost 200 Russians were 
killed and many more were wounded in the fighting, but 
Yeltsin kept control of the government. 
In December 1993, elections were held for the ~ew Russian 
law-making body called the Federal Assembly. To the world ' s 
surpriseJ many seats were won by members of parties that 
oppose further reforms, including nationalists and . 
communists. Such an assembly membership may·make it harder 
to poss laws that will continue reforms . 
THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 
Russia still needs to toke many steps to create a 
democratic system of government. In the United States and 
other democratic notions, it took many years to create the 
institutions needed to make a democracy work. A new 
const itution was approved in 1993, but Russia still needs a 
good courts system and political rorties that will make the 
government work in the interest of the people. 
A NEW COLD WAR? 
The Russian people hove no traditions of democratic 
government . The new constitution gives the president great 
powers. Some fear that Russia will soon move away from 
democracy and once again become a country ruled by one strong 
leader. 
In 1996J Russians will vote for a new president, and 
there is a danger that Yeltsin could be replaced by a leader 
who will use his powers to stop democratic reforms. 
Nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky hos promised thotJ if 
elected President of Russia, he will reconquer the former 





Unless the economy improves ond·a true· democratic system 
of government is set upJ there remains the chance that 
control of Russia will fall into the hands of a leader or 
group hostile to the United States. The renewal of the Cold 
War would be a great threat to the future of the world. For 
that reoson1 what happens in Russia and other parts of the 










HovJ did the Communist Party control the government and 
people of the Soviet Union? 
Identify and explain the events leading up to the foll 
of the Communist Porty in the Soviet Union. 
Identify the members of the CIS 1 and explain the 
purpose of this new organization of countries. 
Describe the current relationship between Russia and 
the former r8publics. 
Why is democracy i n Russia n danger? What effects 
could the end of democracy n Russia have on the world? 
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SPECIAL REPORT/NUCLEAR WEAPONS & THE RED ARMY 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most serious problems caused by t he breakup 
of the Soviet Uniori has been the issue of the nation's 
nuclear weapons and armed forces. 
Until 19911 four republics hod nuclear missiles placed 
within their borders. They were Russia1 Ukraine 1 BelarusJ 
and Kazakhstan . Until recently, many of these weapons were 
still targeted at the U.S . As long as they exist 1 there is 
the danger they will be used in future disputes between 
countries or ethnic groups. The United States and other 
countries are encouraging the Soviets to destroy their 
nuclear weapons and hove even offered to help them do it. 
Arc t ic 0 ·c e • n 
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 
OF THE 
' FORMER SOVIET 
RO::i>U5LICS , . 
~ ~ 
....... 




l! strategic T•ctical 
ICAM bomber nuclear 
litetl baMS -.>on• 
>.t.:\ 
, ·~, , 
~ ! 
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Loeations of nuclear weapons in the former .sov iet Union . 
The end of the Cold War cost many Soviet nucledr 
scie~tists their Jobs. Desperate for moneyJ some of them may 
be willing to work for other tountries or willing to sell 
information and materials to dangerous nations 1 like Libya 
and Iran. Such on arrangement could lead to the spread of 
nuclear weapons to even more countries, increasing the 
chances they may be used. 
In addition, the Soviet Union kept one of the world's 
largest and most powerful armed forces during the Cold War. 
The Red Army had millions of men placed across the Soviet 
Union. Disputes hove started recently about which countries 
will get to control different ports of the old Soviet Army 
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-and Navy. Many of the 
their own armed forces 
have even claimed army 
their own. 
former republic now wont to create 
to protect themselves. Some republics 
equipment within their borders as 
Thousands of Russian soldiers are still stationed 
former republics. The Russian government cannot bring 
home because it doesn't have enough housing for them. 
army units ore no longer getting paid and must survive 
their own. Some soldiers have even sold their weapons 






So~e people fear that unless conditions improve for the 
armed for·cesJ they might become port of an effort to take 
over the government. Even though the Cold War is overJ the 
old Soviet Army and its weapons of destruction are still a 
potential threat to world peace. 





constitut ion - - A ~ri tten pid~·of government. 
·corruption -- ..-B ~shonesty. Corrupt official s may accept 
bribes and use '·!heir positions to get rich. 
coup -- A sudden overthrow of a government . . 
democracy··-- A system of government in which the people 
choose their own leaders and help make decisions. 
dissidents -- People who protest or speck out against their 
government. 
dominant -- Controlling o~ ruling over another. 
institutions -- An organization set up to accomplish o 
certain goal (ex:. educational system) . 
military -- The armed forces of a country (army, 
navy, etc.). 
political party -- A group that has its own ideas about how 
to run the government. Parties try to get their own people 
elected to public office so that they can run the government 
as the party sees fit. 
radical -- Extreme action or idea. 
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TOTAL AREA: ll,505.8 ~q Bi 
Land area: 10.965 . 2 sq ml 
LAND BOUNDARJES : 779.4 miles 
COASTLlNE- 0.0 ~iJg~ 
CONPARATJVE AREA : 
6llghtly larger than. Maryland 
LAND BOUNDARIES: 
A~erbaljan (east l 566 km, 
Az~rb~lj~n (~outhl 22! km, 
G&orgla 164 km , Iran 35 km, 
·rud•.gy ZE.8 km 
DISPUTES : 
vlo l e~t and long6tandlng dispute 
with Azerbaijan over ethnically 
ArBenl a n exclave of 
Nagcrno-Karabakh; some 
; rrgdQntl~m by ArrnQnJ ~n~ )lvlng 
In southern Georgia ; traditional 
do~~nd~ on formQr Arrn~n) ~n J ~nd~ 
In Turkey have greatly subsided 
CLINATE : 
cont inental, hot , and subject to 
d1-ough i. 
TERPAJN · 
nlgh A~rnc;rrd~n P J ~tQ~u ~ i ih 
mountain : little forest land ; 
f~;t flowin~ rivgr~ ; good ~oil in 
Aras River val le~ 
NRlURAL RESOURCES : ~ 
s mali deposits of gold, copper , 
molybdenum , zJnc, aJumlna 
LAND USE : 
10~ arable land; NA~ permanent 
crop~; NA% mg-do~• -nd p~~turg~; 
NA% forest and woodland; NA% 
othgr, NA% irrlg~t~d 
ENVJRONMENT : 
pol Jut Ion of R~zdan and Aras 
Ri vers, air pollution ln Yerevan 
~ 
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TOTAL AREA: J3,436.3 ~q nl 
Land area : 33.243.2 sq ml; lnc l udes 
the Na~hlchevan' Aut onomous Republic · 
and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast; reg!on's autonomy was 
•boll~hQd by Rzgrb• ij• n Suprgng 
Sovlet on 2G Nover1ber 1991 
LAND BOUNDARlES : 1.251.1 n! !es " 
COA5TLlNE : ~ . 0 r1 i 1es 
LUMPARAlJ VE AREA: 
slightly l arger than Maine 
LAND eouNDARJE5 : 
Ar menia (~est l 566 k.rn . Armenia 
(;outhwgct) 221 k~ . Goorgi~ 322 
km _ lran (south) 432 kn, l ran 
( ~outhwo~t l 175 "n, Ru~~i• 284 
k.m, lurkcy 3 km 
DJSPUTES : 
violent and longs:andlng dispute 
wit h Ar ner. la over s t atuG of 
Na;orno-Kar~bakh, lesser dispute 
COMCQrn~ N~kh,chpv~n· ; ~O~Q 
A=~rls des!re absorption of 
•nd / ar un ific•t ion wlih th~ 
ethnically Azeri portion of Jran ; 
minor irrpdgnti~t d i~puto~ • long 
Georg i a border 
CL JM~TE : 
dr y, s enlar ld s teppe ; subject t o 
d~ought 
lERRA l N: 
l arge , flat Kura lowland (muc h of 
lt below sea level I with Grea t 
Caucasus Mountains to the north , 
k~r•b•kh Upl~nd ln WQ~t; B~ku 
lies on Aspheson Peninsula that 
jut~ i nto C~;~ i •n SQ• 
NATURAL RESOURCES : 
petroleum, natural gas. Iron ore. 
nonf e r rous metals , alumina 
LAND USE : 
NA% •r•b)g l~nd ; NA% pgrm~ngnt 
crops ; NA~ meadows and pastures ; 
NA~ forg~t ~nd ~oodl~nd ; _NR% 
other; Includes 76~ of cultivated 
l •nd irrlg~tgd Cl . Z n!! l ion 
hec tar es I 
ENV JRONNENl : 
l ocal scientists consider 
Rp~heron PPnln~ul~ . Jncludlng · 
Baku and Sumgalt , and the Casplan 
SQ• t o bQ mo~t gco loglc~l ly 
devastated area ln the world 
bpc~u~Q of ~gvorg ~Jr •nd w•tor 




iOTAL AREA: 80,154.4 ~q Bl 
lznd area: 80.154.4 sq ml 
LAND BOUNDARJES: 1.925.4 miles 
COASTLlNE : 0.0 miJQ~ 
COMPARAl lVE AREA : 
Gllghtly smaller than Kansas 
LAND llOUNDAfH E5 : 
latvl~ 141 km . Llthuanla 502 km, 
Pol~nd . 605 "n, Ru~~j ; 955 km, 




r>l Jo and mol6t; tranG!t lona J 
betuee~ continental and maritime 
·.., 
TERRAJ-N : 
ggngr-i l~ fl~t -nd ccr.t - ln~ Auch 
r>arshland 
NATURAL RESOURCES : , 
forest land and peat deposits · 
LAND US~ : 
arable land NA%; permanent cropG 
NA~ ; meadows and pastures NA%; 
for eGt and woodland NA% ; other 
NAI · lrcludes Irrigated NAI 
ENVJRONMEtfl : 
~outhgrn p•rt of Bgl•ru~ highly 
contaminated ulth fa) lout from 
1986 nuc]g-r r g-ctor ~ccidgnt -t 
' Chernoby J ' 
NOTE : 
Jandlock.ed 
A""rh,.,ii:oin . --··-~·.a-·. 
Ge.ograph\: 
NOl E_ 
landl ocked; major polluters a r e 
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101AL AREA: l7,413.l ~q Bi 
Land area : 16.679.5 sq ml ; (Includes 
l,526 Islands In the Ba!tlc Sea ) 
LAND BOUNDARJES : 346.2 ml Jes 
COAS1LINE : 865.8 miles 
CONPARA1JVE AREA: 
s! lght l y l arger than New 
Ha~pshlre and Vermont combined 
LAND BOUNDARIES : 
L~tvl ~ 267 km, Ru~~l~ 290 km 
DISPU1ES· 
lnternatlonal small border strips 
~long 1hQ northQrn ( N•rv~ ) ~~d 
&outhern CPetserl) sectlons of 
eastern border wlth Russia ceded 
to Russla In 1945 by the Estonlan 
SSR . 
CLI MATE: 
ro~r itimg , ~Qt , ~odor-tg wlntor~ 
1ERRP. JN : 
r1ar sh'O. lowl ands 
~~TURAL RESOURCES. 
~h.a l e o I l, peat . phosphor l t e, 
~mbf:I ...... . 
LAND USE: 
22~ arable land; NA% permanent 
crop~, !1~ mQ~dow~ ~nd p~~1urQ~ , 
J lY. forest and woodland; 21Y. 
otner ; Includes NA% Irrigated ; 




101AL AREA: 26,911.2 ~q ~l 
Land area : 26.911.2 sq ml 
LAND BOUNDARJES : 908.0 miles 
COAS1LINE : 192. 7 ~!Jg~ 
CONPARA1J VE AREA : 
s ll gh\ly larger than South 
c~ro J)n~ 
~AND BOUNDAR IES . 
Ar~Qn] ~ l6d kr, A~~rb~ lJ~~ 32: 




war~ and ~1easant ; 
Nedlt~~ranean-l !ke on BiacK Sea 
co.-i:;t 
TERRA JN : 
l crge ly mountai nous ~Ith Great 
C~uc~~u~ Nount~in• ir t hQ north 
and Lesser Caucasus Noun•alnG ln 
the SO~th; (~)chis lowland opens 
Co lchi:; Ja~J~nd op~,,~ 1c t~1~ 
Bl ask -Sea- l·n the •..est . - 1!-ur-a R her 
Bas in !n the east; 9ood sol is Jn 
~Iv~~ veJ}~~ fl~~~ ~l~IM~. 
loothllls of·Colchls lowl and 
NATURAL RESOURCES : 
foro~t J~nd~, h~dropowQr, 
rn~nganese deooGJts. !ran or es. 
coppor, ninar co~ J ~nd oi) 
deposits; coastal climate and 
sells allow for Important tea and 
ci trus growth 
LAND USE : 
NA~ arable land : NA~ permanent 
crop;; NR% mg~do~• ~nd p~;turg~; 
NA~ forest and woodland ; NA~ 
othgr; incl~dQ~ 200,000 hgct •rg~ 
irrigated 
ENVJRONNENT : 
air pollution, particularly ln 




10TAL AREA: l,049,149.5 ~q ~! 
Land area · 1 .038,809.8 ~q ml 
LAND BOUNDARJES: 7. 465.5 ~I leu 
COASTLINE : 0 . 0 Al)Q~ 
CONPARA1JVE AREA : 
si l ghtly less than,{oµr_ times the 
elze o{ Texas 
LP.ND BOUNDARIES : 
Chin• 1 , 533 kA, Kyrgy2~t •n 1 , 051 
km, Russia S , 846 km , Turkmenistan 




dry continental, about hal1 !s 
dG1;Qr1. 
TERRA JN : 
extends from the Volga to the 
Alt • i mount ~in- •nd fron thg 
plains ln western Siberia to 
oasis and desert ln Cent r•l Asia 
NA1URAL RESOURCES: 
patro )gu~. co•J , Jr.o.n, ~n901neae , 
chrome. nickel , cobalt, copper, 
~olybdenum , lead , zinc , baux!~e . 
goJd, ur•ni um, i ron 
LAND USE : 
NA~ arable land; NA% permanent 
crop~; NA% rng~dow- •nd F•~turg~; 
NA% forest and woodl and; NA~ 
other; Jnc )udes NA% Jrrlg•ted 
ENVJRONNENT: 
drying up of Ar•l SQ~ l e c~ucing 
Increased concentrations of 
chg nlc•l p~-tic ldg~ ~nd n~tur•l 
salt G; l ndust r I al pol l ut l on 
NOTE : 
landlocked , Kaza~hstan doe6 
border t he Aral Sea CJ ,015 kn) 
and the Caspian Sea (1,894 kA) 
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Moldove 
TOTAL AREA : 13,01 1 .6 ~q rnl 
Land area : 13.011.6 6q ml 
LAND BOUNDARJES: 863 . 3 miles 
COASTLINE: 0.0 Bl)g~ 
CONPARATlVE AREA : 
slightly more than t~lce ~he size 
o1 Ha~dj 1 
LAND DOUNDAP!ES: 
Porn~ni~ 450 krn, Ukr~in~ 939 km. 
~JSPUl ES : 
potent Jal dispute with Ukraine 
o v Qr forrn~r •authorn BQ-~~r~b i ~n 
areas; northern Bukovlna ceded to 
Ukraine upon Moidova ' s 
Incorporation Into former USSR; 
l~ternal with ethnic Russians In 
t he lr~n~-DnQ;tr ~nd G~g~uz 
~usll~s In the South 
C~ lNAlE · 
mi ld w int Qr - . u~rrn -umrnQr~ 
TERRA JN. 
ro ll Ing ~Gpf;e. -<;!r-a<"t.7'3~iope 
scJth to Blac~ Sea 
~ATuRAL RESOURCES : 
lignitQ 1 pha~phoritQ~ gyp~uM 
cAND USE 
NAX arable land; NA~ permanent 
crops; NA~ meadows and pastures; 
~~~ for~st and woodland ; NAE 
other; Inc I udes NAX Irr I gated 
-------·---·----- --·-----· 
i1 Ru~~ ie 
Geography 
TOTAL AREA: 6,592,734 .7 ~q Bl 
Land a rea: 6,562,078.4 s q ml 
LAND BOUNDARIES: 12. 516: 5 rn I I es 
COAST LINE · 23 , 401.5 roll~~ 
CONPARATJVE AREA: 
61 lghtly mar~ \~an 1.8 times the 
size oi the U£ 
LAND BOUNDAR JES · 
Az~-b~lj~n zea km, B~l~ru~ 959 
km China (scutheastl 3 , 605 km. 
Chin~ (~outh ) 40 km, E~t onl~ 290 
km, Finland 1,313 km, Gecrgla 723 
km, K~z~khst~n b,846 •rn, No- th 
korea 15 krn. Latvia 217 kB, 
Lithuania (Kallnlngrau Ob;a3t l 
227 km, Mongo !! a 3,441 km, Norway 
167 k~. Poland IKallnlngrad 
Oo l~~t) 432 k~. Ukr~lre 1,576 ~m 
DISPUTES: 
Inherited disputes frorn former 
USSR incl uding : •get ion~ of thg 
boundary ulth China, a s ection cf 
the bounaar~ uJ~h 1ajlk1s~dn ; 
boundary with Latvia. ~lt huanla , 
and Estonia , Etorofu, Kunashlr!, 
~r.d Shlkot~n J~ ) ~nd~ ~nd thQ 
th~ H-bo"; 3 ;~J~nd group accuplod 
b~ tne .Soviet Union In l~4S. 
cialmed 00~ Jap~n; maritime 
dispute with Norway over portion 
of the Barents Sea ; has made no 
1grritarj~) cl~im ln Rnt~rctlc; 
(but has reserved the right to do 
~a ) ~nd doP• net rocagniz~ thQ 
=lalms of any other nation 
C~INATE : 
ranges from steppes In the south 
through hu~ld continental In much 
of European Russia; subarct ic In 
5Jberi~ to tundr~ clim~tQ Jn the 
polar north; ulnters vary from 
coo l ~Jong Bl~c~ SQ~ co~~t to 
frigid In S iberia ; summerE var~ 
fro~ ~-r~ ;~ tho ~tQppQ~ to cool 
alonq Arctic coast 
TERRA1N . 
bread plain with low hill s west 
Ur~l~; v;~t conifgrau~ forg~1 ~nd 
tundra ln Siberia; uplands and 






NA1URAL RESOURCES : 
ulde natural resource base 
Including ~~jar dgpo~ it~ of a l J, 
natural gas, coal, and Bany 
~tr.~t~gJc ~l ngr• l~; tJ~bgr; notQ 
- form ida bl e obs tac l9s of 
cJl,.ate, terraln, a nd distance 
hinde r exploltatlon of natural 
resources 
LAND USE: 
NP~ ~r~b)Q l~nd; N~% pgrm~ngnt 
crops, NA~ meadows and pastures; 
NAZ for~6t ~nci uoodl~nd; NAZ 
other; Include• NA": Irriga ted 
ENVJRONNEN1 : 
desp It e ! t 6 &.I Zi?.. o.nl \ol .a _..,.al l 
percent~ge of land Is arable and 
rnuch Is 100 far rorth; permafrost 
over ~uch of Si beria Is a major 
impgdJmQnt 1o dQvg Japrngnt ; 
catastrophic pollution of land, 
~ir , ~~tgr. lncluding both lnl~nd 
Udter~a~s and sea co~sts 
NOTE : 
largest country In tne world Jn 
terms of area but unfavorably 
located In relation to major sea 
l~no& of tho uo~!d 
·--... ---.. ----• I 
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101AL AREA : 172,741.1 •q ml 
Land area : 164,246.9 Gq Al 
LAND BOUNDRRJES . 3.866.4 mlleG 
coqSlllNE : 0.0 ni lg• 
COMPARAllVE AREA· 
sl JghtJy•Jarger t~an Ca l lforn la 
~------·-·- ---- ·-·-- ---- -·+>- -- ,-
LAND !JOUNDAAIE5 : 
IHgharilAtan 137 kA, l<azal<.hstan 
2,203 kn, Kyrgyz•tan 1,099 1<.n, 





mostly mid latitude desert; 
•enlarld grass.land ln eas.t 
TERRAIN : 
moGtly flat-10-rolllng sandy 
dg~Qrt wJth dunQ~ ; Fgrg~n~ v~ l Jgy 
Jn east sur rounded by mountainous 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ; 




natura I gas., petroleum, coal . 
gold~ ur~n!urt, ~ l )vpr, coppgr 1 
lead and zinc, tunggten, 
no lybdgnurn 
LAND US!: : 
NA% •rable land; NA% permanent 
crops; NA% meadows and pastures; 
NA% forest and ~oodland ; NA% 
other; Includes NA% Irrigated 
ENVJRONHENT: 
drying up of thQ Ar•) SQa i~ 
re6u)tlng In growing 
concgntr~iion~ of chgm ic~l 
~estlc ! des and natural s a lt s 
NOTE : 
l andlocked, Uzbekistan does 
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UNIT OUTLINE - Russia and the Former Soviet Republics 
I. Unit Objectives: Students will be able to: 
A. Knowledge Level 
1. describe the relative location of Russia and the former Soviet Union on 
a word map. (I) 
2. define the main vocabulary words contained in the reading and use 
each in a complete sentence that demonstrates its meaning. (I-IV) 
3. arrange the major events of Russian-Soviet history on a timeline and 
list the dates for each. (I) 
4. locate and identify each of the 1 5 new countries of this region on an 
outline map. (II) 
5. identify the 11 members of the CIS on the world map. (IV) 
6. identify and arrange the events leading to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union on a timeline. List the dates for each. (I & IV) 
7. identify and explain the basic responsibilities of any government. (IV) 
B. Comprehension Level 
1 . explain the importance of the major events and personalities in 
Russian-Soviet history. (I) 
2. explain the reasons for the tremendous ethnic diversity of the former 
Soviet Union. (II) 
3. explain the origins and purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. (IV) 
4. describe how the Communist Party ruled the Soviet Union and identify 
the ways in which it limited the individual freedom of its people. (IV) 
5. explain the problems created when more than one major ethnic group 
lives within the borders of the same country. (II) 
6. explain the role of nuclear weapons in a nation's defense and the 
concept of "deterrence." (IV) 
C. Application Level 
1 . identify the basic components of a newspaper article and obtain 
information related to current issues from newspaper stories about the 
former Soviet Union. (Ill) 
D. Analysis Level 
1 . explain several examples of how past events in Soviet history have 
shaped the current situation in Russia and the former republics. (I-IV) 
45 
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2. identify the causes and effects of nationalism and ethnic fighting in 
the former Soviet Union. (II) 
3. identify the major faults of the communist economic system and 
explain how they helped bring down the Soviet Union. (Ill) 
4 . identify and describe the major economic problems and challenges 
that have accompanied the attempted transition from communism to 
capitalism. (Ill) 
5. identify the important issues related to the Russian government and 
the future of democratic reforms. (IV) 
6. explain the current problems related to nuclear weapons, 
environmental damage, and the military in Russia and the former 
republics. (Ill & IV) 
7. explain why Russia is the most influential country in this region. 
(II-IV) 
8. describe the importance of interdependence and trade to a country. 
(Ill & IV) 
9 . explain the stresses that defense spending places on the economy of 
a country and relate this to the role that the arms race played in 
weakening the economy of the Soviet Union. (Ill & IV) 
10. explain why it is advantageous for smaller/weaker nations to ally 
themselves with more powerful nations. Relate this to the polarization 
of the Cold War era. (IV) 
11 . describe the costs of war to both winners and losers in any conflict. 
(IV) 
E. Synthesis Level 
1 . create two political cartoons that express opinions about the past or 
current economic problems in Russia or the other former republics. (Ill) 
2. experience the difficulty of compromising and negotiation between 
groups with different goals. (II) 
3. experience how a democratic legislature functions in a parliamentary 
system by role-playing the law makers representing the members of an 
ethnic group living within a larger country. (IV) 
F. Evaluation Level 
1 . make predictions concerning the future of Russia and the former 
Soviet republics. (I-IV) 




II. Materials: To teach this unit I will need: 
A . Section I - The History 
1 . copies of Section I readings. 
2. video: edited review of Russian-Soviet history. 
3. timelines for student activity. 
4. vocabulary and terms review crossword puzzle. 
5. copies of section quiz. 
B. Section II - The People 
1 . copies of Section II readings. 
2. outline maps and instruction sheets for the map 
assignment (Russian and the Former Soviet Republics). 
3. simulation instruction sheets, role descriptions, maps, record sheets, 
and evaluation. 
4. copies of crossword puzzle review. 
5. copies of section quiz. 
C. Section Ill - The Economy 
1. copies of the Section Ill readings. 
2 . copies of the political cartoons assignment and 
overhead transparencies of sample cartoons. 
3. a copy of the teacher instruction sheet for the 
"Capitalism/Communism" activity. 
4. copies of the review crossword. 
5. copies of section quiz. 
D. Section IV - The Government 
1. copies of the Section IV readings. 
2. copies of timelines and crossword reviews. 
3. video : "The New Russian Revolution" (edited). 
4 . materials for simulation: record sheets, instructions, key rules, maps, 
hints. 
5 . Jeopardy review game for whole unit. 
6. copies of final test. 
Ill. Section Timeline (32 days/approx. 6 weeks) 
A. Section I - The History 
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Day 1 - Read text together in class and discuss. Assign vocabulary 
words and review crossword. 
Day 2 - Complete timelines in class and correct. 
Day 3 - Watch and discuss video on Soviet history. 
Day 4 - Check vocabulary. Allow study time for quiz. 
Day 5 - Take quiz and begin silent reading for next section. 
B. Section II - The People 
Day 1 - Group reading and discussion. Assign vocabulary. 
Day 2 - Complete map assignments in class. 
Day 3 - Begin simulation. Make introduction and groups. 
Day 4 - Simulation. 
Day 5 - Simulation. 
Day 6 - Simulation. 
Day 7 - Debriefing: discussion and evaluation of simulation. 
Day 8 - Check vocabulary. Allow study time for quiz. 
Day 9 - Section II quiz and silent reading of next section. 
C. Section Ill - The Economy 
Day 1 - Group reading and discussion. Assign vocabulary. 
Day 2 - Activity: "Capitalism/Communism." 
Day 3 - Introduce political cartoons assignment. 
Day 4 - Work time for cartoon assignment. 
Day 5 - Video: "Chernobyl Disaster" and discussion. 
Day 6 - Check vocabulary and allow study time. 
Day 7 - Section Ill quiz. 
D. Section IV - The Government 
Day 1 - Group reading and assign vocabulary. 
Day 2 - Work on timelines and discuss. 
Day 3 - Video: "The Second Russian Revolution " and discussion. 
Day 4 - Introduce simulation "Guns and Butter." 
Day 5 - Simulation. 
Day 6 - Simulation. 
Day 7 - Simulation. 
Day 8 - Finish simulation, debrief and evaluate. 
Day 9 - Check vocabulary. Allow study time. 
Day 1 0 -Jeopardy review. 
Day 11 -Unit test (Sections I-IV and map) . 
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IV. Teaching Techniques 
A. Group Reading 
Instead of giving notes or lecturing on the content of the reading, I will 
have the students read the handouts together in class. A different student 
will read each section. We will pause for further discussion or questions 
when needed. 
The advantage of this method is that it will give me a chance to discuss 
the topics that might be harder for the students to understand when they are 
reading on their own. It will also increase the number of students who will 
complete the reading since many would not do it if left entirely on their own. 
B. Cooperative Work 
I frequently use cooperative learning groups for in-class activities, 
projects, and simulations. Students will be working in pairs on several of the 
assignments for this unit (maps, timelines, project). When working with 
someone else, students have the opportunity to ask questions and solve 
problems together. It also helps to improve communication and other social 
skills. 
Small groups will be formed for both simulation games. Students will 
need to well work together in order to be competitive in these simulation 
games. Groups are selected in such a way as to include a "balance" of 
personality types and levels of ability. Part of the students' grades for the 
period is based on their attitude and effort in group work. 
C. Simulation Games 
Simulation games are a great way to get students actively involved in 
learning. It gives them a chance to "experience" some of the material and 
concepts that they are reading about. 
The simulation games I have chosen for this unit are outstanding. The 
first game, "Multi-Ethnic Countries, 11 will allow students to experience the 
tensions that can develop between different ethnic groups living and compet-
ing for resources in the same country. When finished, students should be 
able to compare the situations in the game to the current issues related to 
nationalism in Russia and the former Soviet republics. 
The second game, "Guns and Butter, 11 teaches students about the diffi-
culty of managing the economy of a country while having to worry about 
defense. This game will allow students to experience aspects of the super-
power rivalry and arms race of the Cold War. It will allow them to under-
stand how overspending on defense could harm other areas of a nation's 
economy. Finally, it will help them understand the complex inter-relationship 
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between a country's economic, political, defense, and social needs. 
The skills students will develop by playing these games 
include: 
1 . critical thinking 
2. decision-making 
3. organization/record keeping 
4. communication/negotiation 
5. working cooperatively in small groups 
The teacher is the game organizer and must explain and interpret the 
rules. Once each game starts, it is largely run by the students. I have found 
that these kinds of activities are very enjoyable and challenging for the stu-
dents. 
D. Vocabulary 
Each section of the unit includes a number of key vocabulary terms I 
expect the students to learn. At the beginning of each section, I will assign 
the students several of the words to copy into their class notebooks. Next 
to each term, they will do the following: 
1. Write/copy the definition of the word from the unit glossary. 
2. Write a complete sentence using the word. The sentence must use 
the word in such a way as to clearly demonstrate its meaning. 
Prior to section quizzes, I will go over these words with the students in 
class, giving them the chance to correct their answers. The notebooks will 
be collected and graded when the unit is finished. 
V. Evaluation - The letters and numbers listed in parentheses indicate the 
particular objectives from section I that each item is de 
signed to evaluate. 
A. Homework/In-Class Assignments 
1. maps (A-1 ,4,5) 
2 . timelines (A-3 ,6 B-1 D-1) 
3. political cartoons (B-4 D-3,4,5,6 E-1 F-2) 
4. worksheet: economic problems (C-1 D-4) 
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5. vocabulary: notebooks and crossword reviews (A-2) 
B. Simulations 
1 . Evaluation/question forms will be filled out by groups and discussed 
during the debriefings. 
2. Quiz questions: Several questions on the section quizzes and unit test 
will relate to the simulations. 
3. Participation in all activities will be graded and counted toward the 
period's participation grade. 
(A-7, B-2,5,6 0-2,8,9,10,11 E-2,3) 
C. Tests/Quizzes 
1. Section quizzes will include multiple choice, vocabulary, map, and 
short essay questions. 
2. The final unit test will focus on material from the last section, but 
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